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Mobility Measures 
Naomi Schoenbaum* 
Geographic mobility is a celebrated feature of American life. 
Deciding where to live is seen not only as a key personal freedom, but 
also a means of economic advancement. Millions of Americans move 
each year over great distances. But while this right to travel is 
safeguarded by the Constitution, these mobility decisions are not entirely 
free. In terms of the decision to move long distances, employment and 
family reasons are central, and a regime of employment and family law 
“mobility measures” play a significant role in regulating why and how 
we move. This Article first sets forth this new framework of “mobility 
measures,” which are constituted by employment law sorting (moving 
across employers and space for employment purposes) and family law 
clustering (moving with a legally defined, portable family unit). These 
mobility measures not only enable and facilitate long-distance moves 
with billions of dollars of subsidies per year, but they motivate these 
moves to take a particular form: to move for employment purposes, 
taking only our nuclear family with us. In this way, we are encouraged 
by the law to move, yet the law limits our ability to mitigate the 
disruption caused by the move. So while mobility has its benefits, this 
Article argues that it has underappreciated costs. Long-distance moves 
destroy place-specific investments with our closest supporters that are 
crucial for everyday functions, as well as economic productivity. These 
relationship and economic costs affect all long-distance movers, but 
weigh particularly heavily on one group—women. This combination of 
employment sorting and family clustering makes mobility more 
problematic than it needs to be. This Article offers ways of altering 
employment sorting and family clustering to optimize the balance 
between the two and reap more benefits from mobility with fewer costs. 
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These reforms would soften sorting while expanding clustering, and at 
the same time would encourage certain forms of mobility (particularly 
to cities) that would permit a more optimal combination of sorting and 
clustering. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
How portable is your life? This is the question that, on average, 
tens of millions of Americans have to decide every year. The 
portability question, as the New York Times recently noted,1 has 
taken on newfound significance at a time of high unemployment and 
slack job markets, which have led many to look for employment in 
distant locations. Indeed, while many of us know of the massive 
stimulus legislation President Obama sponsored, what is less known 
is that there are billions of dollars allocated in that law to facilitate 
Americans moving because of these economic realities.2 This law fits 
within a larger legal regime that calibrates the portability of our lives. 
Yet we do not see the role the law plays in shaping our moves—or 
how the law could better shape mobility decisions and their 
consequences. 
Geographic mobility is one of the defining features of the 
American ethos.3 Freedom of movement is associated with the 
highest values of American democracy: liberty, autonomy, and 
upward mobility. And we have enshrined the notion of free 
movement with a constitutional right: the right to travel.4 
Residential mobility has been a central American feature from the 
country’s inception. When Alexis de Tocqueville visited the United 
States in 1831, he observed with amazement how easily Americans 
changed residences: “In the United States, a man will carefully 
construct a home in which to spend his old age and sell it before the 
roof is on. . . . He will settle in one place only to go off elsewhere 
shortly afterwards with a new set of desires.”5 
American exceptionalism vis-à-vis mobility persists. Americans 
are twice as mobile as Europeans.6 Between 2008 and 2009, 37.1 
 
 1. Phyllis Korkki, How Portable Is Your Life?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2010, at B14. 
 2. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5 § 1833, 
123 Stat. 115, 386 (2009) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2297–98 (2012)) (providing 
increase in the relocation allowance for federal trade adjustment assistance); U.S. DEPT. OF 
LABOR, UI MODERNIZATION INCENTIVE PAYMENTS—APPROVED APPLICATIONS 1 (2011), 
available at http://workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/unemploy/laws.asp#modern (reporting 
federal payments to states for unemployment insurance modernization, including for benefits 
due to relocation). 
 3. Shigehiro Oishi & Ulrich Schimmack, Residential Mobility, Well-Being, and 
Mortality, 98 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 980, 980 (2010). 
 4. See Leonard B. Boudin, The Constitutional Right to Travel, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 47, 
47–49 (1956). 
 5. Id. (quoting ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 623 (1835)). 
 6. See Larry Long, Residential Mobility Differences Among Developed Countries, 14 
INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 133, 137 (1991). The reasons posited for these differences range 
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million Americans moved.7 Legal scholarship to date has continued 
to celebrate American mobility. In a recent article, Professor Robert 
Ellickson described the benefits of a residential move as “massive,” 
praising mobility as a way to seek better matches for housing, 
housemates, neighborhood, and municipality.8 
But not all moves are created equal. For moves of a greater 
distance—currently nearly one-third of all moves9—there are more 
substantial costs. Employment law and family law are in the middle 
of those costs—not housing law, as scholars like Ellickson and others 
have assumed.10 For these moves, employment and family 
considerations are central,11 with the result that in a typical recent 
year, almost seven million Americans moved an average of 400 miles 
due to their job or family.12 This Article is about this category of 
 
from cultural (the U.S. is a nation of immigrants that keeps moving) to geographic (larger 
country size correlated with higher mobility), but none have been proven. See id. at 135–46; 
Raven Molloy, et al., Internal Migration in the United States, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 173, 
191–92 (2011). 
 7. See DAVID K. IHRKE, ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION 
REPORTS, GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY: 2008 TO 2009 2 (2011), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p20-565.pdf. 
 8. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON HOUSEHOLD MOVES: SHOULD 
FOOTLOOSE AMERICANS ENVY THE ROOTED FRENCH? 36 (2010), available at 
http://www.nd.edu/~ndlaw/conferences/lawecon/Ellickson.pdf. 
 9. See IHRKE, ET AL., supra note 7, at 2. The census separates intracounty moves from 
intercounty, interstate, and international moves. For purposes of this Article, I consider the 
latter three types long-distance moves. From 2008 to 2009, long-distance moves had an 
average distance of approximately 400 miles and a median distance of approximately 100 miles. 
Id. at 15 tbl.6. 24.1% of long-distance moves were over 500 miles. Id. 
 10. See generally ELLICKSON, supra note 8; Stephanie M. Stern, Residential 
Protectionism and the Legal Mythology of Home, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1093 (2009). 
 11. See IHRKE ET AL., supra note 7, at 15–17. Employment-related reasons were the 
most significant for intercounty moves (35.5% in total), followed by family-related reasons 
(26.6%), and then housing-related reasons (24.3%). Id. at 16 tbl.7. Employment-related 
reasons become even more salient for moves of greater distances. See id. at 16 (43.8% for 
moves of 50 to 199 miles; 54% for moves of 200 to 499 miles; and 43.9% for moves of 500 or 
more miles). 
 12. See id. at 16 tbl.7 (26.6% of a total of 11,034,000 long-distance movers for family 
reasons, or 2,935,044, and 35.5% of 11,034,000 long-distance movers for employment 
reasons, or 3,917.070). While geographic mobility in the U.S. remains high from a 
comparative perspective, it has nonetheless been in decline, and has reached near historic lows. 
See id. at 2–3 (noting a very recent slight uptick in moves but due to intracounty moves); 
WILLIAM H. FREY, THE GREEN AMERICAN MIGRATION SLOWDOWN: REGIONAL AND 
METROPOLITAN DIMENSIONS 2 (2009), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/ 
media/Files/rc/reports/2009/1209_migration_frey/1209_migration_frey.pdf. So, for 
example, less than a decade ago, the comparable figure for employment- and family-related 
long-distance moves was 10 million Americans. See JASON P. SCHACHTER, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2002 TO 2003 12 
tbl.F (2004), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-549.pdf. Despite the 
decline in the total number of long-distance moves in the last decade, there has been a modest 
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long-distance domestic moves,13 and the intersection of employment 
law and family law that regulate them. 
A larger constellation of laws, including the federal mortgage tax 
deduction,14 military transfers, and highway subsidies, among others, 
undoubtedly influences long-distance mobility. Employment law and 
family law are the focus of this Article not only because they regulate 
the areas of our lives that motivate a significant proportion of long-
distance moves,15 and thus are key factors in determining why, when, 
and how often we move over longer distances, but also because they 
play a critical role in regulating the welfare and distributional 
consequences of long-distance moves, as discussed below. 
The combination of employment sorting as a result of 
employment law and family clustering as a result of family law is a 
central feature of long-distance mobility and is what this Article 
terms “mobility measures”: the various features of employment law 
and family law that enable and facilitate long-distance mobility. 
Employment “sorting” means that employment law enables and 
facilitates employees to sort easily across employment situations and 
in so doing they can and often do sort across long distances. 
Employment sorting allows for mobility at virtually any time, 
without consideration of socially and economically significant place-
specific roots. Family “clustering” means that family law enables and 
facilitates a cluster of family relationships that are, because of this 
 
increase in the relative proportion of long-distance moves due to employment and family 
reasons. See IHRKE ET AL., supra note 7, at 16 tbl.7 (family reasons increased from 25.9% to 
26.6% of long-distance moves and employment reasons increased from 32.6% to 35.5% of 
long-distance moves). Although the “Great Recession” and the crash of the housing market 
have been blamed, see FREY, supra note 12, at 1, the slowdown in mobility predates these 
developments, and the cause is uncertain, see Molloy, supra note 6, at 175. This Article is a 
response to uncritical proposals to subsidize mobility in the face of this slowdown. See infra 
note 78 and accompanying text. 
 13. This Article focuses on domestic mobility issues. In the international context, the 
difficulties of mobility are, in most cases, magnified and complicated by immigration law. As a 
general matter, the distance is greater, making it more difficult to maintain strong ties in 
another time zone, and there are cultural and language barriers to overcome. Note though that 
the two primary long-distance mobility considerations raised by this Article—employment and 
family—are two of the driving forces behind immigration policy. See Adam Cox & Eric Posner, 
Delegation in Immigration Law (Feb. 2012) (unpublished draft) (arguing that immigration 
law delegates authority to employers, families, and states), available at 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1924382. In a nation as large as the United States, 
spanning several time zones, with metropolitan areas all over the country, domestic mobility 
can mean more than it would in a smaller country. 
 14. Although home ownership is negatively correlated with mobility, the effect of the 
deduction on ownership is modest because larger deductions go to the wealthiest who would 
likely own homes anyway. See Edward L. Glaeser & Jesse M. Shapiro, The Benefits of the Home 
Mortgage Interest Deduction, 17 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 37, 37 (2003). 
 15. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
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cluster, made portable. Although the family cluster is meant to 
provide social insurance upon long-distance moves, by failing to 
recognize other significant relationships across space, it places a 
ceiling on the family cluster instead of a floor. While it is difficult to 
quantify the precise causal role of mobility measures, as this Article 
demonstrates, these laws are key factors in enabling and facilitating 
long-distance moves. 
Conventional understandings of employment law and family law 
fail to realize the ways in which they regulate mobility, and how, 
through their relationship to mobility, these areas of law are linked.16 
Theories of employment law have been primarily concerned with the 
terms of the employment relationship, but have not appreciated how 
these terms affect employment relationships across space.17 Core 
areas of employment law, such as the at-will doctrine and Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enable geographic mobility by 
minimizing attachments between employees and employers,18 
allowing employees to cross employers and geography with ease. 
And employment law facilitates mobility with subsidies to offset the 
costs of relocation undertaken for long-distance sorting moves.19 
Likewise, theories of family law have centered on which 
relationships the law will recognize and what rights and duties will 
be mapped on to these relationships,20 but the spatial component of 
these legal rules has been largely neglected. Enabling family laws 
construct the relevant cluster across space as the nuclear family, 
permitting us to take these crucial family relationships with us as we 
move long distances. Facilitating family laws provide tax breaks and 
other financial support for defined family clusters moving long 
distances and create child-custody rules that facilitate long-distance 
 
 16. By connecting employment law to the regulation of intimate relationships, this 
Article is part of an emerging body of scholarship critiquing the current narrow confines of the 
family law canon. See, e.g., Janet Halley & Kerry Rittich, Critical Directions in Comparative 
Family Law: Genealogies and Contemporary Studies of Family Law Exceptionalism, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 753, 761–65 (2011); Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. 
& POL’Y 117, 135–36 (2011). 
 17. See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Just the Facts: The Case for Workplace Transparency, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 351, 369 (2011). 
 18. See DAWN D. BENNETT & LAURA P. HARTMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR BUSINESS 
30 (6th ed. 2009). 
 19. See sources cited supra note 2; IRS, SOI TAX STATS – INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 
RETURNS, COMPLETE YEAR DATA STATISTICAL TABLES, TABLE 1—INDIVIDUAL INCOME 
TAX, ALL RETURNS: SOURCES OF INCOME AND ADJUSTMENTS, TAX YEAR 2009, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/taxstats/indtaxstats/article/0,,id=133414,00.html (noting over two 
billion dollars in relocation tax deductions).  
 20. See generally NANCY POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: 
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008). 
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moves. 
This Article makes the following core claim about long-distance 
moves and the mobility measures that regulate them: although 
mobility confers a host of significant benefits in terms of economic 
growth and labor-market efficiency,21 as well as in promoting self-
determination and preference satisfaction,22 mobility measures fail to 
take account of the significant costs of long-distances moves. First, 
the combination of employment sorting and family clustering has 
harmful welfare consequences—relationship costs in terms of lost 
local strong ties and economic costs in terms of lost productivity—
that should be considered in calibrating mobility measures. Second, 
there are distributional consequences to long-distance mobility. The 
benefits of mobility are not shared equally within the family, and the 
burdens tend to be borne disproportionately by women. Mobility 
measures do not adequately account for these distributional aspects 
of long-distance moves. 
On the first point, when individuals or families uproot from their 
communities for employment sorting, family clustering means that 
the only form of social cushion they bring with them is the nuclear 
family. Relationship costs result from the loss of close relationships 
outside the nuclear family, known as “strong ties”— the ties that 
involve the greatest amounts of “reciprocity, emotional intensity and 
intimacy” rather than “casual” interactions.23 Local strong ties 
provide support that is crucial for sustaining our sense of self and 
everyday existence, especially for those with caregiving 
responsibilities.24 However, these ties are damaged by the 
combination of sorting and clustering under current legal rules.25 
And while employment sorting may bring economic benefits, long-
distance movers and their employers may also take an economic hit. 
In addition to the welfare deficits resulting from the loss of strong-
 
 21. See infra notes 30–32 and accompanying text. 
 22. See, e.g., WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 58–61 (2001) (arguing 
that mobile homebuyers can “shop for a community” that fits their preferences); Ilya Somin, 
Foot Voting, Political Ignorance, and Constitutional Design, 28 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 202–04 
(2011) (discussing how mobility across jurisdictions enables “foot voting” that leads to a more 
informed citizenry). 
 23. Lior J. Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
953 n.119 (2005). 
 24. See Corey M. Clark, Relations Between Social Support and Physical Health, 
PERSONALITYRESEARCH.ORG, www.personalityresearch.org/papers/clark.html (last visited 
Mar. 9, 2012). 
 25. See William H. Simon, Introduction: Lawyers and Community Economic 
Development, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1821, 1821–23 (2007) (arguing that strong ties do not have 
to be based on geographical proximity). 
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tie support, there is also significant lost productivity, for which the 
current legal regime of sorting and clustering is at least partially to 
blame.26 Shortcomings in decisionmaking, including information 
deficits and cognitive biases, that lead employees and employers to 
make weighting errors in assessing the costs and benefits of sorting 
suggest that sorting decisions may not be welfare maximizing under 
the current legal regime. 
On the second point, the economic costs of mobility measures 
are not borne equally within the family. One spouse—the sorting 
spouse—will drive the sorting move and gain the benefits of sorting, 
while the other spouse—the clustering spouse—will 
disproportionately fill the cushioning support role of the family 
cluster. This distribution of sorting and clustering falls along gender 
lines and plays a significant role in the ongoing gender wage gap, 
with repercussions for single, married, and divorced women alike. 
This Article thus also contributes a spatial understanding of legal 
barriers to gender equality that has gone unnoticed. 
Despite mobility’s significant benefits, then, once it is recognized 
that mobility is not an unmitigated good, laws and policies that 
uncritically promote mobility require further examination. The costs 
and distributional consequences of mobility flow in large part 
because even though employment and family law regulate the same 
area of social experience—long-distance moving—their regulation is 
not coordinated. To remedy these costs and consequences, I propose 
that employment law and family law interact even more than they 
do. While mobility has its benefits, my proposals focus on adjusting 
the costs of sorting and clustering for employers, employees, and 
families to optimize mobility by reaping more of its benefits with 
fewer costs. I offer ways to adjust the relative costs of hiring long-
distance as compared with local employees, so that employers will 
internalize the costs of long-distance sorting, as well as ways to 
provide better support to long-distance sorters and their families. I 
also recommend ways that family law could recalibrate the family 
cluster to recognize the geographic significance of strong ties outside 
the nuclear family. Finally, I propose mitigating the costs of long-
distance moves through an “agglomeration” mechanism that brings 
more employment opportunities and strong ties to the same place: 
the city. While others have sung the praises of cities,27 they have not 
 
 26. See Janice Y. Benjamin & Lorrie Eigles, Support Services to Relocated Families 
Increase Employee Job Performance, 17 J. CAREER DEV. 259, 259–60 (1991). 
 27. See, e.g., EDWARD GLAESER, TRIUMPH OF THE CITY: HOW OUR GREATEST 
INVENTION MAKES US RICHER, SMARTER, GREENER, HEALTHIER, AND HAPPIER (2011); 
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yet recognized the benefits of agglomeration from the perspective of 
mobility measures. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II introduces the legal 
regime of mobility measures: the laws that enable and facilitate 
employment sorting and family clustering. Part III complicates the 
story by setting forth the relationship and economic costs that result 
from mobility measures. Part IV further complicates the story by 
setting forth the distributional consequences that result from 
mobility measures. Part V presents ways that mobility measures 
might be modified to optimize the benefits of mobility while 
alleviating its costs. 
II. MOBILITY MEASURES 
Employment law and family law are central parts of the story of 
geographic mobility. The core areas of employment law sort and the 
core areas of family law cluster to create a law of mobility measures. 
In the context of mobility, the combination of employment law 
sorting and family law clustering means that individuals move long 
distances for employment and bring their nuclear families with them. 
Central employment and family law doctrines enable this form of 
mobility by making these long-distance moves more likely to 
transpire and by defining the terms of these moves. Other key 
employment and family law doctrines directly facilitate long-distance 
mobility by adjusting the costs and consequences of these moves to 
make them more likely and more rewarding. All together, billions of 
dollars of government funds are spent on employment and family 
measures that enable and facilitate sorting and clustering.28 The 
amalgam is a profound and sometimes problematic combination of 
mobility measures. 
 
A. The Law of Work and Mobility 
Sorting is a definitional feature of employment law. In the 
employment context, sorting means that individual employees move 
across employment situations to maximize their labor value. 
Maximizing labor value may mean finding employment, earning 
higher wages, developing human capital, or achieving more fulfilling 
work. The values underlying employment sorting are twofold: liberty 
 
David Schleicher, The City as Law and Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1507. 
 28. See supra note 19. 
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and efficiency. The “free choice to work” includes not only whether 
one works, but where one works.29 Employment sorting is also seen 
to promote efficiency and growth. Because workers vary in their 
productivity across jobs, “[t]he problem is one of optimally assigning 
workers to jobs.”30 Unbounded sorting, especially across geography, 
expands opportunities and allows for better matches between 
workers and firms.31 
Geographic mobility flows from this sorting rationale for 
employment law. Place of residence is linked to place of work 
because of the norm of (and need for) workers’ physical presence at, 
and thus residential proximity to, the workplace.32 Under the 
neoclassical economic theory of the labor market, geographic 
mobility serves as an equilibrating mechanism that distributes people 
and wealth.33 Workers move from areas where jobs are dwindling (or 
lower paying) to areas where workers are needed (or earnings are 
higher).34 Long-distance moves in particular are investments to 
achieve higher wages and develop human capital.35 This is especially 
true for workers with greater investments in human capital, who can 
reap greater benefits from long-distance moves. Indeed, long-
distance moves are more common among workers with more 
education, which means that this Article addresses a phenomenon 
that, while surely touching all segments of the population, is more 
common among a particular social class.36 
 
 29. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Coming Crisis of Work in Constitutional Perspective, 82 
CORNELL L. REV. 523, 531 (1997). 
 30. Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972, 
974 (1979). 
 31. See HOLGER BONIN, ET AL., IZA RESEARCH REPORT NO. 19: GEOGRAPHIC 
MOBILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: OPTIMISING ITS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL BENEFITS 52 
(2008), available at 
http://www.iza.org/en/webcontent/publications/reports/report_pdfs/iza_report_19.pdf. 
 32. Residential proximity to the workplace is relative, and depends on willingness to 
commute. See infra Part V.C on commuting. 
 33. See Michael Greenwood, Human Migration: Theory, Models, and Empirical Studies, 
25 J. REGIONAL SCI. 521, 527 (1985). 
 34. See id. 
 35. See Kathryn L. Shaw, The Influence of Human Capital Investment on Migration and 
Industry Change, 31 J. REGIONAL SCI. 397, 401 (1991). 
 36. See SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that 23% of movers with a bachelor’s 
degree made an interstate move, as compared with 15% of movers with less than a high school 
education). Although short-distance moves are more common than long-distance moves on 
average, one education group was more likely to move more than 500 miles than to move 
under 50 miles: those with graduate degrees. Id. at 11. See infra note 99 for additional 
discussion of education, class, and mobility. 
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1. Enabling laws 
Core employment law doctrines enable sorting, and in so doing, 
enable geographic mobility. By defining when and why employment 
relationships with employers and particular worksites can permissibly 
begin and end, employment law regulates the frequency with which 
employees sort, and thus the frequency with which they move over 
longer distances to sort. By keeping attachments between employees 
and employers (or worksites) to a minimum, enabling laws 
encourage sorting both on the part of employers—by allowing them 
to hire, fire, and transfer at will—and employees—by allowing them 
to depart and start at will. Enabling laws also encourage sorting by 
eliminating barriers to sorting, including discrimination, residency 
requirements, and job-lock37 associated with employer-provided 
benefits. 
 a. Maintaining a loose tie between employees and workplaces. 
Employment law that regulates the tie between employers and 
employees favors sorting, regardless of whether it relates to job 
switching or job transfers. The key doctrine governing this tie is 
employment-at-will.38 Under this doctrine, either an employer or 
employee can terminate the employment relationship without cause, 
at any time, which means there are no general restrictions on 
employees’ ability to sort across firms.39 Because protections against 
termination (for example, anti-discrimination laws and terminations 
against public policy) serve as only limited exceptions to employers’ 
broad firing discretion,40 employment-at-will remains the organizing 
principle of the employment relationship.41 The ability of employees 
to move freely across employers under the at-will regime embodies 
the notion of employment sorting.42 And employment sorting 
 
 37. The phenomenon of workers staying in jobs to avoid the loss of health insurance has 
been referred to as “job-lock.” Jonathan Gruber & Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance and 
Job Mobility: The Effects of Public Policy on Job Lock, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 86, 86 
(1994). 
 38. Although the at-will relationship is governed by state law, all states but one 
(Montana) apply some version of it. See Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will 
Employment as an Interjurisdictional Race to the Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. 
REV. 453, 459 (2008). 
 39. See RICHARD A. BALES, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING EMPLOYMENT LAW 1 (2007). 
 40. Julie C. Suk, Discrimination at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment 
Opportunity in Conflict, 60 STAN. L. REV. 73, 79 (2007). 
 41. See Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of 
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 73, 77 (2000). 
 42. See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 
973–74 (1984). 
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embodied in the at-will regime has only intensified with changes in 
the employment relationship in recent decades. Until the 1970s, 
most employees worked for one employer throughout their careers, 
moving up the ranks of a single hierarchical firm.43 Now, most 
American workers are mobile, with shorter job tenure, sorting 
between firms as the means to career advancement.44 Employment-
at-will enabled this enhanced sorting; under a legal regime of job 
security, this transformation in the employment relationship could 
not have occurred. 
 This regime also has a spatial component. Because employment-
at-will places no restrictions on employees’ ability to sort across 
employers, it enables geographic mobility that is often a component 
of employment sorting.45 In contrast to a system of fixed 
employment contracts, an at-will regime provides greater flexibility 
that makes it more likely employees will move long-distance for a 
new job. Rather than being restricted to sorting when a contract 
ends, the at-will regime allows employees to search for and take 
advantage of new job opportunities continually, regardless of when 
or where they materialize.46 Especially in the new economy, where 
workers expect that each new job will provide human capital returns, 
long-distance mobility for employment sorting is a key component 
of maximizing human capital.47 And in an age when employees are 
more likely to switch careers and fields, at-will employment frees 
them to take advantage of location-specific opportunities that arise in 
other fields, particularly those that are time-sensitive or in a 
regionalized industry (e.g., dot-com boom jobs in Silicon Valley). 
In an era of downsizing, when employers are more likely to 
utilize their at-will rights, long-distance moves may simply be a 
necessary part of remaining employed. In a slack labor market, if the 
only job available requires an employee to move, that is what she will 
do. But for workers with less human capital, employment-at-will may 
result in job turnover with fewer compensating benefits from sorting. 
So, despite the liberty associated with sorting, especially for those 
 
 43. See Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the 
Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519, 535 (2001). 
 44. See id. at 548. 
 45. See Bonin, et al., supra note 31, at 34 (finding a strong association across E.U. 
countries between geographic mobility and the frequency of job changes over one’s lifetime). 
 46. See Long, supra note 6, at 140–41 (positing that the difference between contract 
and at-will employment regimes may help to explain the difference in mobility rates in Europe 
and the United States). 
 47. See Shaw, supra note 35, at 400–01. 
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with fewer job options and especially in a slack labor market, 
employment-at-will may lead to sorting without reward.48 
Geographic mobility for employment sorting purposes underlies 
the law’s approach to non-compete clauses. Courts will typically 
enforce these clauses if they are “adjudged ‘reasonable’ in time and 
geographical scope.”49 Therefore, a reasonable restriction foreclosing 
competitive activity within a particular geographic area would require 
the employee to move to another geographic area if the employee 
wishes to continue in the competitive occupation—a likely 
proposition given the employee’s human capital investments in that 
particular occupation. Courts have upheld geographic restrictions 
based on business contacts the employee made or could have made 
during the course of her employment, allowing a reasonable scope to 
encompass a commutable region (and sometimes more), thus 
necessitating a long-distance move to work in the occupation upon 
enforcement of the covenant.50  
Employment law enables geographic mobility even when it 
comes to staying with the same employer by maintaining a loose tie 
between an employee and her particular worksite. The employer’s 
right to terminate an employee at will includes the right to transfer 
employees to a new (and distant) location.51 While the at-will system 
of course allows the employee to quit to avoid the transfer, the 
matter is often not that simple. Unequal bargaining power between 
employee and employer, the employee’s firm-specific human capital, 
and lack of other employment options may make it difficult for an 
employee to exercise this right to exit.52 
Federal law that protects employees from layoffs enables 
transfers. The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 
 
 48. See Katherine V.W. Stone, Revisiting the At-Will Employment Doctrine: Imposed 
Terms, Implied Terms, and the Normative World of the Workplace, 36 INDUS. L.J. 84, 95, 97 
(2007) (discussing how employment-at-will is associated with lack of job security and labor 
mobility, and concomitant risks for employees). 
 49. Outsource Int’l, Inc. v. Barton & Barton’s Staffing Solutions, Inc., 192 F.3d 662, 
669 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting from a panel enforcing a restrictive covenant not to 
compete); see generally, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian 
Malsberger ed., 2d ed. 1998). 
 50. See John Dwight Ingram, Covenants Not to Compete, 36 AKRON L. REV. 49, 67–69 
(2003). 
 51. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 972 (assuming right to transfer is subsumed by the at-
will relationship). 
 52. See Peter Linzer, The Decline of Assent: At-Will Employment as a Case Study of the 
Breakdown of Private Law Theory, 20 GA. L. REV. 323, 408–09 (1986) (“The longer the 
employee has worked for a company, the more specific his job skills have become, the less 
mobile he is, and the more his investment in the firm becomes his only means of livelihood and 
self-respect.”). 
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(WARN) Act, which applies to employers with one hundred or more 
employees—a small minority of employers—requires covered 
employers to give notice of mass layoffs, plant closings, and 
relocations that result in specified employment losses.53 But when an 
employer relocates, the employer does not have to count as part of 
the employment-loss totals any employee offered a transfer to a site 
within a reasonable commuting distance, or a transfer to any other 
site that the employee accepts.54 That the employer can avoid layoff 
considerations by relocating employees, even to a distant location, 
encourages transfers, including long-distance ones. It will not be easy 
for the employee to reject an offer of certain employment, as even a 
faraway job may be more valuable than unemployment insurance 
benefits (or the limited backpay available under the WARN Act).55 
In certain instances, employment law may even remedy the violation 
of employment rights with a long-distance transfer. Under the 
National Labor Relations Act, an employer may not relocate a plant 
to avoid unionization.56 But the NLRB has ordered as a remedy for 
such violations that the employer reinstate employees at the new 
plant location and pay their moving expenses.57 While the tradeoff 
between transfer and layoff is one many employees might be willing 
to make, such transfers nonetheless weigh heavily on employees in 
ways that mobility measures fail to capture.58 
 b. Removing barriers to sorting. Employment law sorts via 
provisions that remove barriers to employment sorting. This section 
discusses three of these areas of law: anti-job-lock measures, anti-
discrimination law, and restrictions on employment residency 
requirements. 
First, congressional efforts to reduce “job-lock”—employee 
immobility caused by employer-provided non-wage benefits, 
 
 53. 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2006). The employment-loss level that triggers protection varies 
depending on the reason for the employment loss. Compare id. § 2101(a)(2) (50 employees 
for plant closing), with id. § 2101(a)(3) (500 employees, or 50 employees if they make up at 
least 33% of the employer’s active workforce, for mass layoffs), with id. § 2102(d) (the number 
of employment losses for two or more groups of workers reaches the threshold level, during 
any ninety-day period, of either a plant closing or mass layoff). 
 54. Id. § 2101(b)(2). 
 55. Id. § 2104(a)(1)(A). A handful of states regulate work relocations, primarily by 
requiring notice to employees of such relocations. See, e.g. CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1400–1406 
(West 2011). 
 56. See Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972). 
 57. See Robert A. Swift, Plant Relocation: Catching Up With the Runaway Shop, 14 B.C. 
INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1135, 1160–61 (1973) (collecting cases). 
 58. See infra Parts III and IV discussing the costs of long-distance moves. 
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especially health insurance—are sorting measures. Employment is the 
primary source of health insurance in the United States.59 Employees 
who fear losing their insurance coverage upon switching jobs avoid 
new employment opportunities.60 Legal reforms over the last several 
decades have taken aim at remedying this anti-sorting feature of 
employment benefits. The Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation 
Act (COBRA)61 and the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA)62 made health insurance more portable 
across jobs by extending the opportunities for coverage after an 
employee leaves a job and by limiting restrictions that an employer 
can place on benefits for preexisting conditions. The sorting 
component of these correctives is evident in the floor debate on 
HIPAA: “Everyone agrees that job lock must be unlocked so that 
people can move from job to job . . . .”63 Health care reform—
including the recent federal health care overhaul—that loosens the 
link between employment and health insurance by providing 
coverage outside of employment, has also been justified as a job-lock 
corrective.64 With regard to pensions, reductions in vesting periods 
for defined benefit contribution plans are part of these pro-sorting 
reforms.65  
To the extent these measures free employees to sort across jobs, 
they also enable employees to sort across geographic regions. By 
assuring continuing health insurance coverage, these measures 
reduce the cost of switching jobs, which is particularly significant for 
 
 59. More than 90% of private employees receive their benefits from their or a family 
member’s employer. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY & HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008 at. fig.7 (2009). Whether this will change with the 
implementation of health care reform is a matter of debate. See Jonathan Cohn, About that 
McKinsey Report . . . the Critics Were Right, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 24, 2011, 12:25 PM), 
http://www.tnr.com/blog/jonathan-cohn/90696/healthcare-mckinsey-obama. 
 60. See Alac C. Monheit & Philip F. Cooper, Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Theory 
and Evidence, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 68, 82 (1994) (reviewing mixed literature on the 
magnitude of job-lock and finding a modest effect). 
 61. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1168 (2006) (requiring that employers allow employees and 
their dependents the option to purchase coverage for a period of time after it would otherwise 
terminate, which reduces the concern of lost coverage upon leaving a job and allows employees 
to remain covered during a waiting period). 
 62. Id. §§ 1181-1183 (2006); I.R.C. §§ 9801-9806 (2006). 
 63. 142 CONG. REC. H9780 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Gus Bilirakis); 
Id. at H9787 (statement of Rep. Pat Roberts) (remarking that nearly four million Americans 
per year might be able to sort better with HIPAA’s job-lock correctives in place). 
 64. See Monheit & Cooper, supra note 60, at 69. 
 65. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006). As the majority of employees with pensions now have 
defined contribution plans with no vesting requirement, such as 401(k) plans, pension plans 
have even less impact on employees’ mobility. See Marion Crain, Managing Identity: Buying 
into the Brand at Work, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1179, 1194–95 n.49 (2010). 
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already costly long-distance sorting moves. For married couples in 
which a spouse’s job provides health insurance for the family, a long-
distance move for a married employee will likely mean that the 
spouse will have to switch jobs, too. With anti-job-lock measures, the 
family can move, even if it disrupts the spouse’s job, with protection 
for their health insurance coverage.66 Greater sorting may thus be 
one unintended effect of health care reform.67 
Second, anti-discrimination law removes barriers to employment 
sorting. Without prohibitions on discrimination in hiring, 
employees, especially those who belong to groups traditionally 
marginalized in the labor market, could be limited to working at 
firms that hired workers of their “type.”68 Without protections 
against discrimination, employees’ ability to sort across firms would 
be limited. Laws like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 define 
categories of employees who might not enjoy the full benefits of 
sorting and bar hiring discrimination against them.69 While 
discrimination persists, and hiring discrimination in particular is 
notoriously difficult to prevent,70 anti-discrimination laws aim to 
open all jobs to employees of all types. Anti-discrimination law is 
especially important for enabling long-distance sorting in light of 
regional differences in attitudes towards protected groups, including 
women, minorities, and various religions. Federal anti-discrimination 
law therefore seeks to create a national labor market for employees to 
sort among firms across geographies without regard to protected 
group status. 
Third, constitutional regulation of employment enables long-
 
 66. For lower income workers, the lack of employer-provided non-wage benefits, such 
as health insurance, can contribute to excessive job switching, without the compensating 
benefits from sorting to a better a job. See SUNHWA LEE, KEEPING MOMS ON THE JOB: THE 
IMPACTS OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHILD CARE ON JOB RETENTION AND MOBILITY 
AMONG LOW-INCOME MOTHERS iv (2007), available at 
http://www.iwpr.org/pdf/C360KeepingMoms.pdf. Among low-income working women, 
the greatest predictor of employment success is staying in the same job—the opposite of 
mobility—and employer-provided health insurance can play a key role. Id. 
 67. That is, if health care reform leads to less employer-provided coverage. See Stone, 
supra note 48. 
 68. Limited matching between employer and employee could occur even in the absence 
of employer animus. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 59–72 (1992). If employee preferences are determined 
by group characteristics, then employers may prefer homogeneous workforces to reduce the 
chance of conflict among their employees. Id. 
 69. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)–(e-17) (2000). 
 70. See Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time that You Know: The Shortcomings of Ignorance as 
Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an “Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 99, 125–26 (2007). 
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distance sorting through the right to travel.71 By the early nineteenth 
century, the “right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to 
reside in any other state, for purposes of . . . professional pursuits” 
was recognized.72 More recently, in assessing the constitutional right 
to travel, the Supreme Court explained that “[f]reedom of 
movement is important for job and business opportunities,”73 and 
that “a resident of one State is constitutionally entitled to travel to 
another State for purposes of employment free from discriminatory 
restrictions in favor of state residents imposed by the other State.”74 
This protection has meant that courts have struck down residency 
requirements for hiring and professional associations.75 The right to 
travel thus not only embodies the norm of employment sorting, but  
 
enables this type of sorting by barring restrictions on it, at least by 
public employers. 
 
c. Facilitating laws. Sometimes employment law acts as a 
mobility measure by rewarding long-distance sorting with 
compensation, including direct subsidies for the relocation of the 
worker, as well as indirect subsidies for maintaining the family cluster 
upon a long-distance sorting move. Under the Trade Act of 1974,76 
the federal government provides billions of dollars77 of assistance to 
workers injured by import competition who relocate long distance78 
 
 71. “American constitutional law has long frowned on rules that impair the right of 
internal mobility.” Adam B. Cox, Immigration Law’s Organizing Principles, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 390 (2008); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The citizens of each State shall be entitled 
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 
(1999) (holding that a state’s one-year residency requirement to receive federal welfare benefits 
unconstitutionally infringed upon the right to travel); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. 
ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 284–302 (5th ed. 1995) (noting that the dormant 
commerce clause limits restrictions on mobility). 
 72. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230). 
 73. Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 519–20 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 74. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 535 (1978). 
 75. Att’y Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898 (1986) (striking down hiring 
preference for civil service employment for veterans based on state residency requirement). The 
Court has also struck down residency requirements for membership to the state bar, but under 
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. See Supreme Court of Va. v. Friedman, 487 
U.S. 59 (1988); Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985). 
 76. 19 U.S.C. § 2272 (2006). 
 77. DEP’T OF LAB., TRADE ADJUSTMENT ASSISTANCE REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE ON 
FINANCE OF THE SENATE AND COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 19 (2010), available at 
http://www.doleta.gov/tradeact/docs/AnnualReport10.pdf (giving state-by-state financial 
statistics of assistance). 
 78. 19 U.S.C. § 2298(a)(2) (2006) (covering only moves not within a reasonable 
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for other employment. Eligible workers are entitled to job training, 
job-search allowances, and relocation allowances to move for a new 
employment opportunity.79 The tax code permits an income-tax 
deduction for long-distance, work-related moves,80 which subsidizes 
employment sorting. Expenses incurred “in connection with the 
commencement of work . . . at a new principal place of work”—for 
example, the cost of movers, real estate agents, and the like—are 
deductible, without any cap.81 In 2009, deductions for moving 
expenses totaled about $2 billion.82 The enthusiasm for additional 
sorting subsidies has only increased as anxiety about unemployment 
in the Great Recession remains high. One recent proposal 
recommended an extension of federal funding, akin to trade 
adjustment assistance, for long-distance sorting moves in the form of 
a general “mobility bank” that would provide relocation loans to a 
broader set of unemployed workers.83 
Another form of sorting subsidy aims to offset relocation costs 
not just for the individual, long-distance sorter, but also for the 
sorter’s family cluster that joins her in the move. The Trade Act84 
and the relocation tax deduction85 further subsidize sorting in this 
way by subsidizing the relocation of the sorting employee’s family. 
Unemployment insurance (UI), as “modernized” by the recent 
stimulus package, also facilitates long-distance sorting through this 
type of indirect subsidy. UI is a composite state and federal program 
that provides up to twenty-six weeks of partial wage replacement.86 
Historically, states denied UI benefits to workers (“clustering 
spouses”) who quit a job to follow a spouse (“sorting spouses”) who 
needed to relocate for employment because such quits were deemed 
 
commuting distance). 
 79. Id. § 2298(b). A certified worker is eligible for relocation assistance when the 
worker is unemployed, local employment is not available, and the worker has an offer of 
“suitable employment affording a reasonable expectation of long-term duration in the area in 
which the worker wishes to relocate.” Id. § 2298(a)(2). 
 80. I.R.C. § 217(c) (covering only moves of a particular mileage). 
 81. I.R.C. § 217(a); I.R.S. PUBLICATION 521 CAT. NO. 15040E 7, 11 (2010). 
 82. See IRS, supra note 19. 
 83. Jens Ludwig & Steven Raphael, The Mobility Bank: Increasing Residential Mobility 
to Boost Economic Mobility, THE HAMILTON PROJECT 7 (2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/10_mobility_bank_ludwig_rap
hael/10_mobility_bank_ludwig_raphael.pdf. 
 84. 19 U.S.C. § 2298(a)(2) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 617.3(q) (1989) (defining family as 
spouse and dependents for purposes of covered expenses). 
 85. I.R.S. PUBLICATION 521 (2010), supra note 81, at 8 (explaining that the deduction 
applies for “anyone who has both [the] former and new home as his or her home”). 
 86. Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insurance and Wealth Redistribution, 49 UCLA L. 
REV. 335, 340, 344–45 (2001). 
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voluntary.87  
In response to criticism of the failure to acknowledge mobility 
and the proportion of two-income families affected,88 Congress 
included in the federal stimulus package additional conditions on 
incentive funds for state UI programs to provide benefits to 
clustering spouses.89 A state satisfies the condition when it does not 
disqualify an employee from receiving UI benefits because the 
employee leaves her job to accompany her spouse “(I) to a place 
from which it is impractical for such individual to commute; and (II) 
due to a change in location of the spouse’s employment.”90 For the 
clustering spouse to qualify for benefits, the sorting spouse must be 
relocating for employment purposes at a distance that would make 
commuting infeasible.91 The provision reduces one of the significant 
costs associated with long-distance sorting: the loss of spousal  
 
income. In this way, UI benefits for clustering spouses subsidize 
long-distance sorting. 
B. The Law of Family and Mobility 
Long-distance moves raise questions of relationship fracturing: 
who within a community of intimates—not only those within our 
homes, but also extended family, friends, caregivers, and those who 
receive our care—will come with us in our travels, and how does this 
community of intimates constrain us in our travels? Through its 
distribution of rights and privileges, family law answers this question 
with family clustering: people move with their nuclear family units. 
The selective nature of family clustering—that some but not all of 
our intimates move with us—encourages mobility by creating self-
sufficient, portable family units. Defining a limited number of 
relations that are part of the family cluster provides support upon 
relocation without making it too difficult to uproot. 
 
 87. See, e.g., Slusher v. Dep’t of Commerce, 354 So. 2d 450 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
See infra Part IV.B.1 for a further explanation of these terms. 
 88. See Implementing the Unemployment Insurance Modernization Provisions of the 
Recovery Act in the States, in NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT 7 (Feb. 2010), 
http://nelp.3cdn.net/8316a05b0d995d0885_k3m6bny02.pdf. 
 89. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, 42 U.S.C. § 1103(f)(3)(B)(iii). 
 90. Id. 
 91. A state may provide broader eligibility, but the Unemployment Insurance 
Modernization Act does not require it. See Letter from Dep’t of Labor, Unemployment 
Insurance Program Letter No. 14-09, Attach. III, at 6 (Feb. 26, 2009), available at 
http://wdr.doleta.gov/directives/attach/UIPL/UIPL14-09.pdf. 
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1. Enabling laws 
Foundational family law doctrines encourage nuclear family 
clustering, and in so doing enable long-distance moves by making 
part of our lives more portable. Family law privatizes care and 
support within the domestic family.92 Family law’s determination of 
who has rights and duties as family members determines with whom 
and near whom we want (and perhaps need) to live. Through a 
distribution of benefits and burdens, family law prioritizes the 
nuclear family above other intimate relationships—friendships, 
extended family, and others who provide care and support—creating 
the nuclear family as the relevant unit for clustering purposes. Family 
law shapes the family cluster by mandating obligations of care and 
dependence between spouses93 and from parent to child.94 
However, family clustering functions as much by granting rights 
and duties to those inside the family as by denying rights and duties 
to those outside of it. Family law does not recognize the network of 
caregivers who assist parents in childrearing.95 For example, benefits 
to care for a child, such as those afforded under the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA), are typically limited to parents, as is the 
right to see a child at all.96 The Supreme Court invalidated a state 
statute granting visitation rights to nonparents, under which 
grandparental visitation was ordered over a parent’s objections, as 
overly intrusive to parental authority.97 Family law also denies to 
friends the benefits that it grants to families, such as FMLA leave, the 
ability to make decisions about medical care or to inherit under state 
intestacy rules, and the recognition of certain private agreements.98 
 
 92. See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family 
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2187 (1995). 
 93. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 720 (West 2011) (requiring that spouses “contract 
toward each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support”); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. 
art. 98 (1999) (“Married persons owe each other fidelity, support, and assistance.”). The 
doctrine of necessaries obligates spouses to discharge each other’s debts for necessary expenses. 
See, e.g., Forsyth Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Chisolm, 467 S.E.2d 88 (N.C. 1996) (requiring wife to 
pay for husband’s medical expenses). 
 94. See IRA MARK ELLMAN ET AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 503 (5th ed. 
2010) (“All American jurisdictions recognize a parental duty to support minor children.”). 
 95. See Melissa Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of 
Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L. REV. 385, 387 (2008) (discussing how family law pays 
little heed to the network of caregivers who assist parents in childrearing). 
 96. See id. at 407–08. The Family and Medical Leave Act is an exception by providing 
leave for an employee to care for an ailing parent. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
 97. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66–67 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
 98. Laura Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191 (2007); see 
also Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law, 54 UCLA L. REV. 631, 697–98 (2007). 
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Because rights and duties associated with care and support are kept 
within the family, the nuclear family need not remain geographically 
close to the extended community of intimates. For example, because 
a grandparent does not have a legal right to visit her grandchildren, a 
child and his or her parents can move away from the grandparents 
without any legal restriction. On the flip side, the family cluster also 
means that the family members—spouses and children—remain 
together when the family moves to provide and receive the care 
privatized within the family. If a family cannot remain intact, often a 
move will not be made, because this care would not be available 
through public or other private means.  
Nor does family law acknowledge the care that the nuclear family 
provides to those outside of it. The general lack of legal ties between 
adult children and their parents, and the associated mobility it 
enables,99 can be viewed in contrast to a proposed law in China that 
would require adult children to provide their parents with physical 
and emotional care, and would give parents a right to sue to enforce 
it.100 Such an obligation to visit elderly parents would limit long-
distance mobility, as most people, especially those without extensive 
resources, would need to live near their parents to comply.101 
The selective granting of rights and duties structures the 
domestic family as the part of our support network that needs to 
come along on a long-distance move. In this way, family law 
provides some social insurance upon such moves. In fact, this shock-
absorbing function of the family cluster may make us more 
comfortable with the notion of employment sorting. It is hard to 
imagine that mobility would be viewed so glowingly without the 
default rule that at least some of one’s closest intimates would 
cushion the blow of a move. While family law enables long-distance 
 
 99. The proportion of adult Americans living far from their parents varies based on 
education level. More than half of married individuals with both parents alive and living 
together lived within ten miles of either their own parents or their in-laws, and two-thirds lived 
within twenty-five miles, but those with a college education are separated from their parents by 
a median distance of one hundred miles. Peter A. Rogerson et al., The Spatial Separation of 
Parents and Their Adult Children, 83 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOGRAPHERS 656, 660, 663 
(1993). 
 100. China Law to Make Children Visit Parents, BBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2011) 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-pacific-12130140 (explaining the proposed 
amendment to China’s Law on Protection of the Rights and Interests of the Aged). 
 101. The legal history illuminates the relationship between employment sorting, family 
clustering, and care between adult children and their parents. Lawsuits seeking to enforce 
contracts or for quantum merit compensation for care provided by adult children to their 
elderly parents arose with the industrial age and the rise of geographic mobility to seek work 
away from one’s family of origin. See HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE 
YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE (2012). 
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moves by family clustering, some relationships are not portable, an 
issue discussed in later Parts. This “underclustering” feature of family 
law perhaps paradoxically enables mobility. Keeping the number of 
necessary family members to a minimum increases the portability of 
the clustered family unit by allowing nuclear families (and singles) to 
uproot from a network of caregivers and friends. Even if “it takes a 
village” to raise a child, it would be logistically difficult, if not 
impossible, to take the village along on a move. The self-contained 
cluster avoids this difficulty. 
For mobility purposes, when relationships are sufficiently 
analogous to marital or parental relationships, they might be brought 
along on a move. But a long-distance move imposes such costs and 
risks that, even among cohabiting couples, one partner might not 
move across the country for the other without a marital 
commitment. There are other relationships—for example, the 
relationships of same-sex couples—that may be afforded status in 
some jurisdictions but not others. These variations in family law 
across jurisdictions may affect choice of domicile and thus mobility, 
as those seeking particular rights might choose to move to (or 
remain in) a jurisdiction that affords them those rights.102 
2. Facilitating laws 
Beyond enabling mobility by constructing a portable family 
cluster, family law subsidizes and eases the long-distance moves of 
the family cluster. By adjusting the costs of maintaining the family 
cluster at moments of mobility, the law puts a thumb on the scale in 
favor of the family cluster, as well as mobility. 
 
a. Direct subsidies. Laws such as the Trade Act and tax 
deductions that subsidize the family’s relocation along with the 
sorting employee not only facilitate employment sorting, but also 
family clustering.103 Likewise, changes in UI benefits for clustering 
spouses described above provide direct subsidies for mobility of the 
 
 102. For instance, a gay couple that wants to marry can only do so in certain states, and 
the couple may need to remain domiciled in those states to continue to enjoy the benefits of 
the marriage. Interstate recognition of same-sex marriages is limited by the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA), state “mini-DOMAs,” and conflicts of law rules. See Andrew 
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages and Civil Unions: A Handbook for 
Judges, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2143 (2005); see also Courtney G. Joslin, Travel Insurance: 
Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent Families Across State Lines, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 31, 
33, 38 (2010) (discussing inconsistent state laws of parentage of children born through 
artificial insemination and implications for mobility). 
 103. See supra Part II.A.2. 
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family cluster.104 Recall that before recent changes in the law, courts 
routinely denied UI benefits to clustering spouses. For example, a 
court considered a case in which the claimant “left her employment 
. . . to be with her husband but urges that her decision to do so was 
for the preservation of her ‘American home way of life which is the 
basic foundation of this nation.’”105 The court “agree[d] . . . that it 
is desirable to preserve marriages and keep families together,” but 
denied benefits because the quit was voluntary.106 The later 
recognition of this “American home way of life” (modified by the 
prevalence of two-income households107) with the granting of UI 
benefits to clustering spouses facilitates mobility to preserve the 
family cluster. In keeping with family clustering, the subsidy is 
provided only to spouses and not to other intimates. In addition to 
its incentive effect, the policy sends a doubly-reinforcing, family-
clustering message: a spouse should quit a job to relocate for her 
spouse’s employment (and the law will subsidize such a departure), 
but no one else should (and if they do, the law will provide no 
assistance).  
 b. Facilitating mobility and clustering after divorce. Family 
clustering as a mobility measure remains salient for married couples 
with children after divorce. After divorce, family clustering faces a 
challenge. When married couples with children divorce, a question 
may arise about relocation.108 Increasingly, shared custody 
arrangements, and thus post-divorce family unity, are seen to be in 
the child’s best interest.109 If both parents want to have a substantial 
relationship with the child, the parents likely need to live near one 
another. Mobility seems in tension with clustering once the cluster 
significantly ruptures. For both parents, family clustering has 
increasingly adjusted to accommodate mobility, albeit imperfectly. 
Under shared custody arrangements, one parent is often 
designated the primary custodian (the “primary parent”) and the 
other acts as the “secondary parent.”110 Family law places essentially 
no limits on the secondary parent’s mobility. For the secondary 
 
 104. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 105. Slusher v. Dep’t of Commerce, 354 So. 2d 450, 451 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978). 
 106. Id. 
 107. See infra Part IV.A. 
 108. The issue of relocation may also arise at the initial custody determination, but this is 
less common. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 94, at 720. 
 109. See Theresa Glennon, Still Partners?: Examining the Consequences of Post-Dissolution 
Parenting, 41 FAM. L.Q. 105, 113–17 (2007). 
 110. Id. at 115. 
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parent, shared custody can be terminated at any time; he can move 
and forego shared custody, perhaps even as a matter of constitutional 
right.111 Indeed, after the three-year mark, in about half of all joint 
custody cases, physical custody ends up being exercised by only one 
parent (typically the mother) substantially all the time.112 Family 
law’s only concern is the secondary parent’s satisfaction of any 
alimony and child support obligations; it does not matter where the 
secondary parent lives.113 Indeed, the secondary parent can move 
away and yet still have a court compel the primary parent to 
accommodate communication and visitation with the child to 
maintain the secondary parent’s relationship with the child.114 In 
other words, the secondary parent can still be part of the family 
cluster from afar. 
 
Even for the primary parent, family law clustering still provides 
some leeway, and increasingly more so, to move and keep the 
custodial situation—and thus the new family cluster of the primary 
parent and the child—intact. When the primary parent wants to 
relocate a substantial distance with the child and the secondary 
parent objects, there is a question of whether the primary parent can 
move without giving up custody of the child. About half the time a 
court permits the primary parent to move with the child—most 
frequently to support the two most accepted reasons for long-
distance moves: employment sorting (i.e., to pursue an employment 
opportunity for the primary parent or a new spouse) and clustering 
of another family unit (i.e., remarriage).115 Indeed, in recent decades, 
standards for custody relocation have liberalized,116 further 
facilitating mobility of the primary parent.117 Even when the primary 
 
 111. See Arthur B. LaFrance, Child Custody and Relocation: A Constitutional Perspective, 
34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 1, 67–80 (1995). 
 112. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL 
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 112–13 (1992). 
 113. See Holder v. Polaski, 544 A.2d 852, 854–56 (N.J. 1988) (noting that “in many 
instances, the mother still receives custody of the children, and the father is awarded visitation 
rights,” and that “[i]mplicit in that arrangement is the right of the father to move elsewhere 
for virtually any reason”). 
 114. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 94, at 722. 
 115. See Glennon, supra note 109, at 123–26. 
 116. See ELLMAN ET AL., supra note 94, at 722. Custody relocation law varies by state, as 
does its liberalization. Notably, California has recently retrenched to allow less mobility for 
primary custodians. See In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (granting physical 
custody to father if mother relocated because of the impact the move would have on the 
children’s tenuous relationship with their father). 
 117. Statutory reforms making it easier to enforce support orders across state lines have 
also facilitated the primary parent’s mobility. See John J. Sampson, Uniform Family Laws and 
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parent is permitted to move, family law still tries to retain some of 
the integrity of the former cluster. In such cases, a court may order 
the primary parent to defray the costs of maintaining the secondary 
parent’s relationship with the child (e.g., the costs associated with 
visitation) as a condition of relocation.118 
The privileged view of employment sorting, as well as the 
underclustering feature of family law, are manifest in courts’ varied 
treatment of relocation requests depending on the reason for 
relocation. A sizeable number of relocation cases address a primary 
parent’s request to move closer to extended family and friends.119 
Parents seeking relocation have cited the economic, emotional, and 
caregiving support that these relationships would provide.120 But 
some courts nonetheless express skepticism about moving to be near 
extended family,121 and others gloss over or downplay the benefits of 
relocating to be near this extended network of intimates.122 For 
example, one court, rejecting a mother’s request to move where 
both sets of her children’s grandparents lived, denied the relevance 
of proximity to these relations, stating that the “family may assist 
them financially and morally wherever they may live.”123 In other 
words, for grandparents, visits are enough.  
This sort of skepticism is especially marked in contrast with 
courts’ generally easy acceptance of family clustering124 or 
employment sorting125 reasons for relocation. For example, one 
court underscored the importance of mobility to cluster with the 
new family by describing a mother’s request to relocate to remarry as 
“the most normal desire in the world.”126 The skeptical view of 
 
Model Acts, 42 FAM. L.Q. 673, 680 (2008) (noting that some version of the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act is the law in all states). 
 118. See, e.g., Walrath v. Pope, 681 S.E.2d 602, 606 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009) (approving 
visitation schedule that required mother who relocated with children to reimburse father for 
one airline ticket per month to visit children); In re Marriage of Condon, 73 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33 
(Ct. App. 1998) (allowing mother to relocate with children when father’s visitation costs were 
offset by reductions in child and spousal support obligations). 
 119. See Glennon, supra note 109, at 134. 
 120. Id.; see also, e.g., In re Marriage of Bianco, No. B161654, 2004 WL 1303620 (Cal. 
Ct. App. June 14, 2004). 
 121. See, e.g., Sill v. Sill, 228 S.W.3d 538 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006). 
 122. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Austin, No. 91,222, 2004 WL 720231, at *1 (Kan. Ct. 
App. Apr. 2, 2004). 
 123. Sill, 228 S.W.3d at 543. 
 124. See, e.g., Arriaga v. Gambardella, No. FA990431585S, 2002 WL 31018577 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 6, 2002). 
 125. See, e.g., Potter v. Potter, 119 P.3d 1246 (Nev. 2005) (granting move for a job that 
would pay a higher salary and would provide assistance in obtaining an advanced degree). 
 126. Arriaga, 2002 WL 31018577 at *4. 
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moves to be nearer to extended family and friends expresses the 
strength of family clustering and employment sorting and their 
correlate: that we move long distance for the family cluster or for 
employment, not for other relationships. Even when these other 
relocations are permitted,127 the parent must nonetheless overcome 
the skepticism. 
III. WELFARE EFFECTS OF MOBILITY MEASURES 
Although the upside of mobility is typically in focus, the current 
configuration of sorting and clustering means mobility often falls 
short of this welfare-enhancing ideal. Long-distance mobility is a 
much thicker social phenomenon with more significant welfare 
effects than mobility measures currently cognize. So while mobility 
can bring benefits, it also imposes costs that require consideration to 
improve mobility’s overall welfare effects. The combination of 
sorting and clustering imposes two types of costs discussed in turn 
below: “relationship costs”—the loss of support of local strong ties 
with intimates outside the family cluster—and “economic costs”—
the loss of productivity resulting from the loss of strong ties inside 
and outside the workplace. Although it is difficult to calculate the 
costs and benefits of sorting and clustering, there are reasons to 
believe that information deficits and cognitive biases lead individuals 
and employers to underestimate the costs of mobility under the 
current regime, limiting their ability to reach welfare-maximizing 
decisions. 
A. Relationship Costs 
Strong ties—our intimates—are enormously important in our 
lives. They provide crucial support and care that help us get through 
the day as well as emotional connections that provide richness and 
texture to our lives. While all strong ties are important, local strong 
ties, in particular, are best equipped to serve central relational 
functions and are likely to fade from a distance.  
1. The strength(s) of local strong ties 
Sociologist Mark S. Granovetter made famous “the strength of 
weak ties.”128 Weaker ties can be helpful by linking together groups 
 
 127. The results of these cases are mixed. Compare In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 
81 (Cal. 2004) (denying relocation to be near extended family), with Tropea v. Tropea, 665 
N.E.2d 145 (N.Y. 1996) (allowing move to be near child’s grandparents and cousins). 
 128. Mark S. Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties, 78 AM. J. SOC. 1360, 1360 (1973). 
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of weaker ties and by transmitting simple information, for example, 
about employment opportunities, across these groups.129 This makes 
weak ties particularly important for success in the market. But it is 
strong ties that provide greater motivation and capacity to seek (and 
give) the more involved forms of support that are necessary for 
everyday functioning and for providing meaning in our lives.130 
Strong ties can perform these functions because, unlike weak ties, 
these relationships are defined by reciprocity and trust,131 and they 
are interconnected (i.e., our close friends are friends with each 
other). Compared with weak ties, strong ties provide a community 
that can transmit the sensitive and complex information necessary for 
care and emotional support.132 Economists tend to think that these 
community-level social resources enhance welfare not only for their 
direct effects on utility, but also because they help address common 
economic problems, for example, overcoming the free-rider problem 
in providing public goods or creating trust between individuals in 
the absence of explicit contracts.133 
Strong ties communicate feelings of love and value, and a sense 
of “belong[ing] to a network of communication and mutual 
obligation.”134 In this way, close ties promote self-esteem and 
happiness, as well as physical and mental health.135 And close ties are 
central to defining who we are: ongoing strong ties help maintain 
“the continuity of our identity through different life stages and 
substantial life challenges.”136 
Strong ties play a critical role in supporting caregiving. In a 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. See Mark Granovetter, The Strength of Weak Ties: A Network Theory Revisited, 1 
SOC. THEORY 201, 209–13 (1983); Barry Wellman, The Community Question: The Intimate 
Networks of East Yorkers, 84 AM. J. SOC. 1201, 1222–23 (1979). 
 131. See Granovetter, supra note 128, at 1361 (explaining that tie strength turns on “the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie”). This has been described as the “transitivity” of strong ties. 
That is, “If Adam and Betty are close friends, and Betty and Charlie are close friends, then it is 
also likely that Adam and Charlie are close friends. See Damon Centola & Michael Macy, 
Complex Contagions and the Weakness of Long Ties, 113 AM. J. SOC. 702, 704 (2007). 
 132. See Granovetter, supra note 130, at 218 (explaining that strong ties enhance speed 
of flow, credibility, and influence of information). 
 133. See Edward Glaeser et al., An Economic Approach to Social Capital, 112 ECON. J. 
F437, F437 (2002). 
 134. Leib, supra note 98, at 655 (quoting Sidney Cobb, Social Support as a Moderator of 
Life Stress, 38 PSYCHOSOMATIC MED. 300 (1976)). 
 135. See Takeo Fujiwara & Ichiro Kawachi, Social Capital and Health: A Study of Adult 
Twins in the U.S., 35 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 139 (2008) (finding that social capital (i.e., 
strong ties) promoted welfare using a sample of twins to control for outside effects). 
 136. Leib, supra note 98, at 655 (noting that strong ties serve as a bulwark against poor 
health outcomes, from lower mental health to shorter life spans). 
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typical week, the majority of children under five years old are in 
some type of childcare arrangement, such as care by extended family, 
daycare, nursery school, or other paid caregivers.137 Beyond paid 
care, caregivers rely extensively on extended family and friends for 
providing care to children, the elderly, and the disabled.138 By 
providing support when public services are overextended, strong ties 
“enhance both efficiency and community.”139 Beyond caregiving 
support, strong ties also provide caregivers an outlet from the 
pressures of domestic life. 
Strong-tie support is particularly salient for certain populations. 
Supportive strong ties play a greater role in communities with fewer 
resources and for those with less support within the family cluster—
single parents.140 In part because women do more carework than 
men, and because women are more likely to be single parents, 
women rely more on strong ties than men.141 Compared with men, 
women have larger strong-tie networks.142 The parties receiving 
care—often children—benefit enormously from strong ties outside 
the family cluster, including stable connections to extended family, 
teachers, and peers.143 And while the support provided by strong ties 
is undoubtedly crucial for members of the domestic family, for those 
who are single, the absence of a single legally and socially designated 
point person to meet material and emotional needs may render a 
network of strong ties still more essential. 
Strong ties from a distance wither into weak ties or nonlocal 
strong ties—what is left after a long-distance move. Physical 
 
 137. Murray, supra note 95, at 390–91. 
 138. Id. at 391–92. 
 139. Allan Silver, Friendship in Commercial Society: Eighteenth-Century Social Theory and 
Modern Sociology, 95 AM. J. SOC. 1474, 1495 (1990) (citing MARTIN BULMER, NEIGHBORS: 
THE WORK OF PHILIP ABRAMS (1986)); see also Granovetter, supra note 130, at 212–13. 
 140. See Murray, supra note 95, at 391–93 (explaining how caregiving networks may be 
particularly significant for single parents and in African-American, Latino, immigrant, and gay 
and lesbian communities); Granovetter, supra note 130, at 211–13; see generally CAROL 
STACK, ALL OUR KIN (1974) (describing how close ties are essential for daily survival in the 
inner city). 
 141. See Margaret Brinig, The Division of Labor Across Time and Generations, in 
MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS (Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth Scott eds., forthcoming 
2012); Isabel Dyck, Mother or Worker? Women’s Support Networks, Local Knowledge and 
Informal Child Care Strategies, in WHO WILL MIND THE BABY? GEOGRAPHIES OF CHILD 
CARE AND WORKING MOTHERS 132–33, 135 (Kim England ed., 1996). 
 142. See Toni C. Antonucci & Hiroko Akiyama, An Examination of Sex Differences in 
Social Support Among Older Men and Women, 17 SEX ROLES 737, 737 (1987) (finding that as 
compared with married men, who tend to rely on their spouses exclusively, married women 
tend to receive support from multiple sources outside the domestic family). 
 143. See Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern 
Sociology, 24 ANN. REV. SOC. 1, 9–12 (1998). 
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proximity is important to providing and receiving care and support 
from strong ties. Many of our most basic needs can only be met with 
in-person contact: transporting people or goods, providing food or 
other items when one is ill, and meeting the everyday needs of 
children or the elderly. Emotional support is often better provided 
through in-person contact, when a person can watch reactions and 
respond in kind.144 The joys of social connection, too, can often best 
be appreciated through in-person contact, by sharing a meal across 
from someone at the table, or by engaging in activities. Indeed, the 
stronger the tie, the more likely the person will provide support,145 
and stronger ties tend to live nearer to one another.146 Assistance and 
frequency of contact increase when people are within close 
geographic range.147 And beyond the significance of physically 
proximate individual ties, there are institutions—schools, daycare 
centers, and nursing homes—for which proximity matters. 
Despite the increasing influence of technology in allowing people 
to maintain faraway relationships, many features of the closeness of a 
relationship are still associated with geographic proximity. The value 
of strong ties in providing caregiving support, particularly for 
everyday or emergency needs, is largely lost when the caregiving 
network is not geographically close. While nonlocal strong ties may 
still play a significant role in providing emotional support, 
technology is not a substitute for physical proximity. Despite e-mail, 
Facebook, Twitter, and long-distance phone calls, distance still 
weakens relationships.148 While the Internet helps to maintain 
contact with distant and weak ties, relationships’ sensitivity to 
distance is similar pre- and post-Internet, and the most active ties are 
still nearby.149 Technology has made it easier to find more 
customized ties, for instance, an online support group for a rare 
medical condition or an eBay seller, but these ties are often 
 
 144. Face-to-face contact may be important for emotional contagion (i.e., to feel what 
those around us are feeling) which allows us to relate more fully to those near us. See Elizabeth 
F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic Costs, and the ADA, 93 
GEO. L.J. 399, 435–38 (2006) (explaining how emotional contagion operates through in-
person contact). 
 145. Wellman, supra note 130, at 1222–23. 
 146. See Diana Mok et al., Does Distance Matter in the Age of the Internet?, 47 URB. 
STUD. 2747, 2750 (2010) (citing studies reporting that large percentages of strong ties live 
near each other). 
 147. Wellman, supra note 130, at 1219–22. 
 148. Mok, supra note 146, at 2750, 2778 (explaining that the telephone and the internet 
tend to “work synergistically with face-to-face contact” to supplement rather than replace it, 
and that e-mail frequently serves to arrange visits and telephone calls). 
 149. Id. at 2775, 2779–80. 
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weaker.150 Facebook and other “friendships” maintained through 
new technology have little in common with true friendship: they are 
devoid of the intimacy that is the hallmark of a strong interpersonal 
bond.151 
Nonetheless, there can be too much of a good thing when it 
comes to local strong ties. Because reciprocity is a hallmark of strong 
ties, strong ties often mean not just more support, but more 
demands as well.152 Over-reliance on strong ties may be harmful to 
low-income populations, who are burdened by these strong ties and 
less likely to develop the weak ties that are helpful in the labor 
market.153 Just as women disproportionately rely on strong-tie 
support, so too do excessive strong-tie demands disproportionately 
burden women. Strong ties may also burden beyond obligations, 
with mobility as a corrective. Escaping strong ties can mean an 
escape from restrictive norms, for example, an abusive relationship, 
or a community that rejects gays and lesbians, and an opportunity to 
develop more accepting strong ties.154 
At the same time, several features of strong ties buffer against 
overburdening. There are returns to scale from strong ties, which 
caregivers may exploit by forming shared daycare and babysitting 
schemes.155 Interconnections between strong ties also spread the 
costs of monitoring so that each member need not be constantly 
vigilant about other members’ needs. Moreover, support received 
and support given is not zero-sum. Providing support to strong ties 
brings utility to the supporter,156 at least partially offsetting the 
depleting effects of demands. Even when demands are high, 
knowing that strong ties will reciprocate may be a source of 
camaraderie and comfort. 
Weighing the benefits and burdens of local strong ties is a 
 
 150. Avery M. Guest & Susan K. Wierzbicki, Social Ties at the Neighborhood Level: Two 
Decades of GSS Evidence, 35 URB. AFF. REV. 92, 96, 108 (1999). 
 151. See SHERRY TURKLE, ALONE TOGETHER: WHY WE EXPECT MORE FROM 
TECHNOLOGY AND LESS FROM EACH OTHER (2011); William Deresiewicz, Faux Friendship, 
CHRON. REV., Dec. 6, 2009, at 9, available at http://chronicle.com/article/Faux-
Friendship/49308. Skype makes greater inroads on seeing and talking to faraway ties. 
 152. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Portes, supra note 143, at 14–15. 
 154. See HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY (2000) 
(explaining how mobility was used to escape bad marriages before liberalized divorce laws). 
The post-Reconstruction Great Migration of African-Americans was a means to escape the Jim 
Crow South and seek greater freedoms in the North. See generally ISABEL WILKERSON, THE 
WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION (2010). 
 155. Elder care is less apt to benefit from these economies of scale. 
 156. See Elizabeth W. Dunn et al., Spending Money on Others Promotes Happiness, 319 
SCI. 1687, 1688 (2008). 
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difficult proposition. Strong ties and weak ties are complements, not 
substitutes,157 and success in personal and market-based pursuits 
requires some mix of the two. My goal is not to argue that mobility 
measures should preserve local strong ties above all else or to 
pinpoint the precise circumstances that make mobility worthwhile, 
but to highlight the thickness of the social phenomenon of long-
distance mobility and the costs that mobility measures fail to 
acknowledge. I return to these concerns in Part IV, where I consider 
modifications to mobility measures to account for these costs.  
2. Mobility measures and relationship costs 
Because local strong ties are geographically sensitive, long-
distance moves will result in the fraying of strong ties outside the 
family cluster. Mobility measures impose relationship costs in the 
form of lost local strong ties in two ways. Employment sorting 
means that we move away from local strong ties, and family 
clustering does not provide sufficient cushioning from these lost ties. 
The relationship costs generated by mobility measures can be 
categorized into two types: costs from the loss of strong ties outside 
the family cluster, and costs on the family cluster itself. 
 
 157. See supra notes 128–43 and accompanying text describing the different functions of 
strong and weak ties. 
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 a. Sorting and local strong ties. Mobility measures encourage the 
loss of local strong ties outside the nuclear family. Employment 
sorting ruptures strong ties because long-distance moves are 
motivated by employment instead of proximity to strong ties. While 
it is difficult to assess from the available relocation data, which does 
not account for moves due to multiple factors,158 employment-
motivated moves will, by and large, be moves away from strong ties. 
As an initial matter, strong ties will typically be strongest in the place 
where an individual or family has been living for a while. This means 
that a move away from a domicile of any significant duration will 
likely also be a move away from strong ties. The exception might be 
frequent sorting, in which case the sorter may have been unlikely to 
develop strong ties in the location she is leaving. To the extent that 
individuals limit sorting to locations where they have at least some 
strong ties, the impact of lost strong ties will be mitigated, but not 
eliminated. The long-distance move still requires leaving established 
relationships and routines, and reestablishing relationships and 
routines, both with personal and market-based strong ties. 
 Long-distance sorting imposes the loss of strong ties outside the 
family cluster, with the concomitant loss of care and support benefits 
these strong ties provide.159 A long-distance move places the mover 
in a position of having only weak ties in the new location, at least for 
a while. Unlike weak ties, strong ties “build slowly and incrementally 
over time,”160 requiring significant investments to rebuild. The 
longer the move, the more challenging the replacement of strong 
ties will be, because the mover will be less likely to have connections 
in the new location.161 And even if strong ties can be rebuilt, they are 
not fungible. Beyond the unique connections we have with extended 
family and close friends, market-based care providers also develop 
unique relationships with those for whom they care, and are not 
easily replaceable. Repeated long-distance moves multiply the loss of 
local strong ties, as well as the efforts to rebuild them, and 
expectations of mobility in fact reduce investment in valuable strong-
tie networks.162 The very mobile, such as military families, may 
 
 158. The census only allows one category to be selected as the reason for a move. 
 159. See Portes, supra note 143, at 11 (“Leaving a community tends to destroy 
established bonds, thus depriving [the movers] of a major source of social capital.”); supra 
notes 137–143 and accompanying text on the benefits of strong ties. 
 160. Daniel J. Brass et al., Relationships and Unethical Behavior: A Social Network 
Perspective, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 14, 17 (1998). 
 161. See ELLICKSON, supra note 8, at 29 (addressing the greater relationship costs of 
long-distance moves). 
 162. Glaeser et al., supra note 133, at F439 (finding that mobility reduces social capital 
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simply forego investing in ties that will soon be lost.163  
 Moreover, long-distance sorting causes not only the loss of 
strong ties to the movers, but also the loss of movers to the strong 
ties, which imposes costs that are difficult for the movers to 
internalize.164 Because it takes time to rebuild strong ties in the new 
community, the gain to the new community is not symmetrical with 
the loss to the departed community. The loss may be especially large 
when a long-distance mover has extensive caregiving obligations to 
someone outside the family cluster, for example, an ailing parent, 
who is left behind. Outside the FMLA, which provides leave to care 
for a parent, family law does not recognize this type of caregiving.165 
So even if the long-distance sorter brings along a parent to a nursing 
home in the new location, mobility measures do nothing to facilitate 
this extra-nuclear-family clustering. 
Although family law traditionally regulates the social 
relationships in our lives,166 employment law is also part of the story. 
While a long-distance sorting move leads to lost ties, the loss of these 
ties is considered a personal matter and is given no accounting by 
mobility measures. Enabling employment laws exist precisely to 
minimize linkages between employees and any particular employer or 
workplace, with no consideration for local strong ties. To the extent 
that facilitating laws—such as the Trade Act, tax deduction, and UI 
benefits—take into account lost social support upon a move, they do 
so only by providing relocation subsidies for the domestic family, 
replicating the underclustering of family law. While UI’s clustering 
subsidy acknowledges the more significant cost of the clustering 
spouse’s lost income, this loss is still related to employment and not 
social support.  
Employment sorting laws fail to account for features of long-
 
returns and thus investment in social capital). 
 163. See PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, STRENGTHENING OUR MILITARY 
FAMILIES: MEETING AMERICA’S COMMITMENT 15–20 (2011), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2011/0111_initiative/strengthening_our_military_
january_2011.pdf (discussing a government initiative to address the costs of repeated sorting 
by military families). 
 164. Glaeser et al., supra note 133, at F439, F441, F450 (noting that mobility imposes 
lost social capital in the community departed). 
 165. See Weickert v. Weickert, 602 S.E.2d 337, 340–41 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (shifting 
custody to father after mother relocated from Georgia to California to care for her elderly 
parents); supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Vivian Hamilton, Principles of U.S. Family Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 31, 36 
(2006) (“Family law . . . comprises those sets of laws (1) whose purpose is to regulate 
relationships among intimates, or (2) whose operation hinges on the existence of a certain 
family status or relationship.”). 
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distance sorting that exacerbate its relationship costs. Sorting laws 
typically do not consider the sorter’s likely duration in the new 
location, which means they fail to check the most costly form of 
long-distance sorting: repeated mobility.167 Nor do sorting subsidies 
apply to moves to return to a location where strong ties already exist, 
unless these moves would independently meet the employment-
related requirements. So, for example, if a spouse received UI 
benefits for a long-distance sorting move, and the couple wanted to 
return to their initial location (where they had a network of strong 
ties), the couple would receive these benefits only if one of the 
spouses had a qualifying job in the new location. Finally, 
employment-sorting laws fail to consider the magnitude of distance, 
even though longer moves are generally more costly in terms of lost 
strong ties. Sorting laws’ only consideration of distance is a floor—
typically, reasonable commuting distance. 
Women, who rely more than men on strong ties, 
disproportionately bear the relationship costs that mobility measures 
ignore.168 So mobility measures that facilitate only the mobility of 
the family cluster are more likely to allow men’s primary source of 
support to accompany them. And for single mothers, the only strong 
ties that are part of the family cluster are their children. Women also 
spend more time than men developing and attending to the family 
cluster’s strong-tie network, including the ties of parents and 
children.169 This means that the loss of strong ties disproportionately 
imposes a loss to women’s resources, and that the work of rebuilding 
a strong-tie network disproportionately imposes a tax on them. 
 
b. Clustering and local strong ties. The loss of local strong ties 
upon a long-distance sorting move impacts the meaning of the 
family cluster, both for nuclear families and for singles. Viewing 
mobility measures in a dynamic fashion, mobility measures create a 
positive feedback loop that further strengthens the family cluster and 
weakens other strong ties. As people move to sort and cluster with 
 
 167. An exception is the Trade Act, under which a worker is eligible for relocation 
assistance only with an offer of “employment affording a reasonable expectation of long-term 
duration.” 19 U.S.C. § 2298(a)(2) (2006). 
 168. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text. 
 169. See Marybeth J. Mattingly & Suzanne M. Bianchi, Gender Differences in the 
Quantity and Quality of Free Time: The U.S. Experience, 81 SOC. FORCES 999, 1001 (2003) 
(discussing women’s role as “the coordinators of family life” and their “activities on behalf of 
other family members . . . in building and maintaining social relationships and kinship ties”); 
see also ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: 
WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 35 (1989). 
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their family units, their connections to other strong ties weaken, and 
they become increasingly dependent on the family cluster. As 
dependence on the family cluster intensifies, connections to others 
wither, making another move still more likely, and so on. In this 
way, mobility measures reinforce a hierarchy of strong ties that 
privileges the family cluster over other ties. 
This positive feedback loop intensifies domestic family 
relationships. Reduction of strong-tie support in one form—
community strong ties—is partially compensated by an increase in 
strong-tie support in another form—familial support.170 From 1985 
to 2004, Americans reported a marked decline in the number of 
people with whom they discussed meaningful matters.171 People 
reported fewer close relationships with coworkers, extended family 
members, neighbors, and friends.172 The family cluster has picked up 
the slack. Marriage was the only close relationship in which more 
people discussed important matters in 2004 than in 1985.173 The 
number of people who depended entirely on a spouse for important 
conversations nearly doubled, from 5% to almost 10%.174 As 
Professor Stephanie Coontz has written: “As Americans lose the 
wider face-to-face ties that build social trust, they become more 
dependent on romantic relationships for intimacy and deep 
communication, and more vulnerable to isolation if a relationship 
breaks down.”175 
Mobility measures may contribute to these dynamics. Providing 
for the portability of the family cluster but not other strong ties robs 
the family of support that helps it endure stressful events, and places 
more pressure on the spouses to compensate for the loss of those 
ties. This pressure may undermine the family cluster by 
overburdening the marital relationship—so much so that the cluster 
unravels. 
By failing to provide for strong-tie support to join singles on a 
long-distance move, mobility measures impose relationship costs on 
singles. This may make sorting easier, as a single person only needs 
to consider one set of employment needs.176 This is born out in data 
 
 170. See Portes, supra note 143, at 11–12. 
 171. Miller McPherson et al., Social Isolation in America: Changes in Core Discussion 
Networks over Two Decades, 71 AM. SOC. REV. 353, 353–54 (2006). 
 172. Id. at 358–59. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 359. 
 175. Stephanie Coontz, Op-Ed., Too Close for Comfort, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2006, at 
A21. 
 176. Even those with children will have little limit on long-distance sorting except in the 
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that younger people, who are more likely to be single, move more.177 
The flip side is that the single person’s most intimate relations will 
likely not come along. Mobility measures’ failure to acknowledge 
singles’ need for strong-tie support upon a move is still more salient 
given that today “emerging adulthood” is growing, and many 
Americans marry later (or not at all).178 
As friendship is given no accounting in mobility measures, it is 
not surprising that, even for singles, friends tend not to cluster over 
long distances.179 Any person who moves to be nearer a friend risks 
that the friend, who herself will be subject to sorting and clustering 
dynamics, will up and move for a job, a marriage, or a spouse’s job. 
But even a proponent of the legal recognition of friendship, Ethan 
Leib, notes that “[t]he fact that many friendships dwindle . . . is not 
necessarily the symptom of a flawed friendship,” but rather a 
reflection of the fact that “[p]eople move away, get married, have 
kids, . . . change jobs.”180 Leib takes the sensitivity of friendship to 
moves, job changes, and marriages as a given, rather than assessing 
the impact of law. While preferences and social norms undoubtedly 
play a role in these friendship dynamics, so too do mobility measures. 
B. Economic Costs 
Employment sorting and the mobile labor market are prized for 
the efficiency gains they promise.181 To be sure, a geographically 
flexible labor market has been credited with lower unemployment 
rates, better labor-market matching and associated economic growth, 
and greater incentives for human capital investment.182 But this does 
 
case of an objecting secondary parent, see supra notes 115–18, and even then, a move will 
often be permitted, see supra Part II.B.2.b. 
 177. See SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 3. 
 178. Robin Marantz Henig, The Post-Adolescent, Pre-Adult, Not-Quite-Decided Life 
Stage, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 22, 2010, at 28, 30. 
 179. Friends and roommates are not categories of reasons for moves on the census. See 
SCHACHTER, supra note 12, at 12. 
 180. Leib, supra note 98, at 681 n.260. 
 181. See Leon H. Keyserling, The New Deal and Its Current Significance in re National 
Economic and Social Policy, 59 WASH. L. REV. 795, 801 (1984) (explaining that the sorting 
regime created by employment law is aimed at sustained optimal production and economic 
growth). 
 182. See supra notes 30–35. Note, however, that there is modest disagreement among 
economists even on topics related to this point, which is captured, for example, in questions 
about “place prosperity” versus “people prosperity,” and whether governments should invest 
in declining areas. Compare Robert Bolton, Place Prosperity vs. People Prosperity Revisited: An 
Old Issue with a New Angle, 29 URB. STUD. J. 185 (1992) (advocating for place-based 
investment based on the value of “sense of place”), with Edward Glaeser & Charles Redlick, 
Social Capital and Urban Growth, 32 INT’L REGIONAL SCI. REV. 264 (2009) (arguing that in 
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not mean that sorting is an unmitigated good. As an initial matter, 
involuntary sorting necessitated by job loss can pose economic harm 
to employees. Still further, even for purely voluntary sorting, the 
economic consequences of long-distance sorting are more 
complicated.183 Strong workplace ties, as well as the strong social ties 
discussed above, are a key part of individual and firm productivity, 
but they are not portable. The economic consequences of workplace 
and social strong-tie losses require consideration so that employment 
sorting can be optimized.  
1. Local workplace ties and productivity 
The conventional narrative of the benefits of sorting tends to 
focus narrowly on the wage benefits the employee accrues at the time 
of the job switch, and the gains the employer accrues at the time of 
hiring the new employee.184 But returns to job tenure as compared 
with interfirm mobility may be higher than previously thought, and  
 
 
the role of workplace strong ties in enhancing productivity is likely a 
significant reason for this.185  
Strong ties promote worker productivity in a number of ways. 
Strong workplace ties provide access to information, which in turn 
brings access to power and opportunities, and the ability to 
coordinate complicated projects, all of which enhance 
performance.186 Strong ties also contribute to resource sharing, 
 
theory, place-based investments are worthwhile if people are less likely to invest in social capital 
when they know an area is declining, but that the data show little evidence that decline is 
accompanied by lower social capital investment). Place-based investment is the minority 
position. See id. at 264. 
 183. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structure As An Independent Variable in Assessing Stock 
Market Failures, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 547, 556 (2004) (citing relevant studies). 
 184. See Sylvia Fuller, Job Mobility and Wage Trajectories for Men and Women in the 
United States, 73 AM. SOC. REV. 158, 159 (2008) (“[T]he literature on the effect of mobility 
on wages concentrates on the short-term effects . . . .”). 
 185. See Moshe Buchinsky et al., Interfirm Mobility, Wages and the Returns to Seniority 
and Experience in the United States, 77 REV. ECON. STUD. 972 (2010) (finding that the 
economic benefits of labor mobility may be overstated); Lyman Johnson, Individual and 
Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 2215, 2230 (1992) 
(discussing how economic activity productivity must be viewed within the context of social 
relations, and how “social relations themselves may influence the relative efficiency of . . . 
various courses of action.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting KEVIN J. DELANEY, 
STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY, 56 (1992)). 
 186. See Noah E. Friedkin, Informational Flow Through Strong and Weak Ties in 
Intraorganizational Social Networks, 3 SOC. NETWORKS 273, 281 (1982) (addressing role of 
strong ties in conveying information in the workplace); Nancy B. Kurland & Lisa Hope Pelled, 
Passing the Word: Toward a Model of Gossip and Power in the Workplace, 25 ACAD. MGMT. 
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which promotes productivity, innovation, and entrepreneurship.187 
Moreover, strong workplace ties are positively associated with 
affective commitment to the firm, which increases organizational 
citizenship behavior, firm loyalty, and willingness to give back to the 
firm.188 Strong workplace ties, in the form of close friends and even 
“work wives” also provide emotional support and care that can 
contribute to performance.189 In short, employees with strong 
workplace ties “are more efficient than their peers, suffer less stress at 
the office, tend to stay at their jobs longer, and experience less job 
dissatisfaction.”190 
Strong workplace ties are perhaps even less portable than 
community ties. Strong work ties are premised on coworker 
relationships involving repeated interaction in the workplace.191 In 
the context of long-distance moves, not only will strong workplace 
ties no longer be coworkers, but they will also fall out of the mover’s 
local professional circle. Upon starting work in the second location, 
new employees, and especially those who move from afar, are 
considered “outsiders” who do not have the legitimacy to reap the 
benefits of strong ties.192 So the loss of strong workplace ties makes it 
 
REV. 428, 431–32 (2000) (discussing how passing workplace gossip among trusted strong ties 
can confer power); Jone L. Pearce & Amy E. Randel, Expectations of Organizational Mobility, 
Workplace Social Inclusion, and Employee Job Performance, 25 J. ORG. BEHAVIOR 81, 86 
(2004) (noting that individuals with central positions in their work group’s advice network 
earn better performance ratings); see also Centola & Macy, supra note 131, at 707, 709–10 
(When “collective behaviors involve complex contagions that require social affirmation or 
reinforcement from multiple sources,” the redundancy of strong ties “becomes an essential 
pathway for diffusion.”). 
 187. See Portes, supra note 143, at 3–4, 12. 
 188. See KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT 
REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE 95–96 (2004) (discussing the importance of 
affective commitment and extra-role behavior, known as organizational citizenship behavior, in 
productivity); Pearce & Randel, supra note 186, at 85 (explaining that strong ties lead 
employees to be more committed to the organization, more willing to work flexibly, more 
likely to subordinate their own goals to the organization’s needs and invest in firm-specific 
skills and knowledge, and more open to cost reduction and other organizational changes). 
 189. See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS 
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY 24 (2003) (“Working adults have more . . . 
conversations about things they consider important with co-workers than with anyone outside 
of their families.”); Sue Shellenbarger, Do You Have a Work Spouse?, WSJ.COM (Feb. 8, 2011, 
10:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2011/02/08/do-you-have-a-work-spouse 
(reporting that in a survey of 640 white-collar workers, “[n]early two-thirds of workers have, 
or have had, a ‘work spouse’—a close co-worker of the opposite sex who shares confidences, 
loyalties and experiences”). 
 190. ETHAN J. LEIB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION OF FRIENDSHIP—AND 
WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT 40 (2011). 
 191. See Shellenbarger, supra note 189 (explaining that this interaction can span intimate 
subjects as well as office talk). 
 192. See Ronald S. Burt, The Gender of Social Capital, 10 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 5, 24 
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harder to perform optimally in the new workplace, over at least the 
medium-term, until an employee can rebuild strong ties. 
Performance costs associated with the lack of strong ties are 
amplified with more frequent mobility.193 
Firms suffer not only because their long-distance sorted 
employees are without their strong workplace ties, but also because 
strongly tied employees collectively create networks with co-workers, 
customers, contractors, and consultants that benefit the firm. These 
networks allow firms to develop structurally embedded relations, 
which consist of an intricate web of routinized transactions that 
reduce transaction costs, saving time and money.194 Employment 
sorting imposes the loss of a departing employee’s relationships and 
routines, and affords their new employers the opportunity to 
appropriate these routines.195 These losses make employee turnover 
and training costly for firms.196 While a firm might still benefit from 
its connections to a former employee, especially one who stays in the 
same industry, through referrals and the like, these benefits diminish 
when an employee is no longer in the firm’s local professional 
community.197 Moreover, the hiring of an “outsider,” especially one 
from far away who likely has no ties in the workplace, may 
undermine trust in the new firm.198  
Employment sorting laws may themselves create expectations 
about the need to be mobile that undermine the motivation to 
develop strong workplace ties, and, in turn, individual and 
organizational productivity.199 Employees who anticipate long-
distance sorting will invest comparatively less in building strong ties 
in the workplace and in a location where they do not plan to remain 
and will place less importance on job tasks that are not consistent 
 
(1998). 
 193. Jeanne M. Brett, Job Transfer and Well-Being, 67 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOL. 450, 457 
(1982). 
 194. Mark Granovetter, Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of 
Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490 (1985); Frank P. Romo & Michael Schwartz, The 
Structural Embeddedness of Business Decisions: The Migration of Manufacturing Plants in New 
York State, 1960 to 1985, 60 AM. SOC. REV. 874, 879 (1995); Brian Uzzi, Social Structure and 
Competition in Interfirm Networks: The Paradox of Embeddedness, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 35, 41–
42 (1997). 
 195. See Griffin Toronjo Pivateau, Preserving Human Capital: Using the Noncompete 
Agreement to Achieve Competitive Advantage, 4 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 328-
29 (2011). 
 196. See id. at 326–29; Buchinsky et al., supra note 185, at 975. 
 197. See Bolton, supra note 182, at 193–94 (discussing altruism and trust that arises in 
local labor markets). 
 198. Burt, supra note 192, at 24. 
 199. See id. at 19; Portes, supra note 143, at 6. 
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with their expectations for mobility.200 So if an employee plans to 
move, she might not spend as much time chatting by the water 
cooler, even though this could build coworker trust that would aid 
in completing future projects. 
2. Local social ties and productivity 
The loss of strong social ties and the pressure on the family 
cluster that result from the current regime of sorting and clustering 
also hinder productivity, thus interfering with the economic goals of 
mobility measures. Issues regarding strong-tie social support—“self 
and spouse losing social ties, moving away from family and friends, 
and establishing new relationships at work”—have been reported as 
the most stressful aspects of a work-related move.201 The loss of these 
strong ties, and the stress associated with it, can affect an employee’s 
ability to acclimate to a new workplace and perform well there.202 
For married couples, the family cluster is the only cushion for the  
 
spouse and her domestic family. For others, this means potentially all 
strong ties are lost. 
Lost strong social ties impose opportunity costs for productivity. 
More time must be spent arranging for and providing care than on 
other productive work. This is hard enough with commercial care 
arrangements. But certain forms of care that are more difficult to 
purchase—care for a sick child, after-hours care—might fall directly 
on parents who have not yet established strong ties to help in a 
pinch.203 This makes balancing work and family even more difficult 
after a long-distance move, sometimes at the expense of work.204 
For those moving with others, productivity may suffer due to the 
consequences of the move on other members of the family cluster. 
The stress of relocation is much greater for individuals whose spouses 
need to find jobs in the new location.205 Those who move alone, on 
 
 200. Cf. Kurland & Pelled, supra note 186, at 435–36. 
 201. Anthony G. Munton, Job Relocation, Stress and the Family, 11 J. ORG. BEHAV. 401, 
405 (1990). 
 202. See id.; Brett, supra note 193, at 452; Peter Pardine et al., Job-Stress Worker-Strain 
Relationship Moderated by Off-The-Job Experience, 48 PSYCHOL. REP. 963, 968 (1981). 
 203. See Joan E. Starker, Psychosocial Aspects of Geographic Relocation: The Development of 
a New Social Network, AM. J. HEALTH PROMOTION 52, 52 (1990) (finding minimal social 
support months after a move). 
 204. See Martha Wiggins Frame & Constance L. Shehan, Work and Well-Being in the 
Two-Person Career, 43 FAM. REL. 196, 196 (1994) (discussing how relocation stress increases 
with the pile-up of demands associated with a move, with a greater negative impact on wives 
than husbands). 
 205. Munton, supra note 201, at 403. 
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the other hand, may be particularly affected by the loss of strong-tie 
support the move induces. For singles, a long-distance sorting move 
will mean that at least initially they may be without any local strong 
ties. This lack of support can lead to feelings of isolation that 
interfere with work productivity.206 Moreover, the lack of strong ties 
may mean that a transplanted single person will want to invest 
additional time and energy building strong bonds. But she may have 
a hard time balancing this desire with work demands, because time 
to develop friendships and even date (the gateway to marriage, after 
all), is generally not considered a legitimate reason for work 
flexibility (even less so than caregiving).207 
3. Mobility measures and economic costs 
To the extent that sorting causes economic costs for long-
distance movers, relocation subsidies and benefits are meant to offset 
these costs. But the costs employment sorting laws offset are aimed 
at the tangible costs at the initial sorting moment—relocation 
expenses for the individual and the family, the portability of health 
insurance, and partial wage replacement for a spouse. There is little 
consideration of longer-term economic costs for employees and 
employers in terms of lost strong workplace ties. Sorting laws fail to 
consider factors that exacerbate the economic costs of long-distance 
sorting: frequency of mobility, distance of move (other than creating 
a floor), and whether there are strong ties in the destination 
location.208 And the cushion that family law provides to insure 
against strong-tie losses—the family cluster—fails to insure against all 
of the local strong-tie losses that matter for productivity. For 
example, despite the significance of workplace relationships, the law 
treats work spouses (and other strong workplace ties) and legal 
spouses in opposite manners—one is switched as a function of 
sorting, and the other is maintained as a function of clustering. The 
failure to recognize important workplace relationships is both cause 
and effect of the mobile employee: because these relationships are 
not recognized, employees have an easier time sorting, and as 
 
 206. See Peter H. Schuck, The Morality of Immigration Policy, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
865, 888 (2008) (noting how co-locating family members can support a worker’s productivity 
upon a move); Starker, supra note 203, at 52 (finding lack of support and isolation after a 
move). 
 207. See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About 
Where, Why, And How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1753, 1766–67 (2001) (discussing perceptions of caregiving as more significant than 
other employee interests). 
 208. See supra Part III.A.2. 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
1206 
employees increasingly sort, these relationships are further weakened. 
In these ways, sorting and clustering fail to account for the loss of 
strong ties bound up in relationships outside the family cluster, the 
investments necessary to rebuild these strong ties, and the impact 
this has on productivity.209  
While lost strong workplace and social ties impose real economic 
costs, stasis can breed stagnation. New ties can inspire new ways of 
thinking.210 Groups that are too tightly knit may exclude outsiders, 
which may make it harder for long-distance sorters to integrate into 
the firm.211 My point, then, is not that mobility undermines 
productivity writ large, but that there are underappreciated costs of 
mobility that could be better addressed by the legal regime of sorting 
and clustering. 
C. Sorting and Clustering Decisions 
Determining when long-distance sorting is welfare maximizing is 
a difficult proposition. Heterogeneity in the role of strong ties in 
people’s lives and in whether any particular move brings the movers 
closer to or further from beneficial or burdensome ties means that 
the benefit-burden calculus must often proceed on a case-by-case 
basis. Individuals likely have the best information about the welfare 
effects of strong ties and mobility on their lives. Nonetheless, people 
have been known to err in predicting the welfare effects of their 
decisions.212 And there are reasons to believe that employees and 
employers systematically err in weighing the costs and benefits of 
long-distance mobility due to cognitive biases and information 
deficits that lead to overestimating the benefits of mobility and 
underestimating its costs. 
On the employee side, optimism bias—the tendency to be overly 
optimistic about the outcome of our actions213—combined with 
focalism—the tendency to focus on the main event rather than 
background details that are equally or more significant214—lead 
 
 209. See Burt, supra note 192, at 11. 
 210. Richard Florida, Cities and the Creative Class, 2 CITY & CMTY. 3, 6 (2003). 
 211. See Burt, supra note 192, at 15 (discussing the link between ties and workplace 
success and the challenges outsiders face at work). 
 212. David A. Armor & Shelley E Taylor, When Predictions Fail: The Dilemma of 
Unrealistic Optimism, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE 
JUDGMENT 334 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (finding optimism bias in a range of 
contexts). 
 213. Id.; Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 806, 806 (1980). 
 214. See David Dunning et al., Flawed Self-Assessment: Implications for Health, Education, 
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people to overestimate their ability to bring about personally 
desirable events, because they fail to correct for unknown or 
unpredictable details of future situations, even though those details 
matter a lot.215 The variety of unknown and unpredictable details 
upon a long-distance move, including those related to a new job and 
a new community, among others, may tend to lead to undue 
optimism about long-distance sorting moves.216 
These biases may be further skewed in the case of long-distance 
sorting due to salience bias and weighting errors—the tendency to 
weigh concrete and easily comparable factors more heavily than 
diffuse and incommensurable factors.217 In the mobility context, this 
means that people might value the more concrete employment gains 
derived from long-distance sorting (salary, title, etc.) than the more 
abstract losses (changes in personal relationships, etc.).218 These 
types of weighting errors are observed with the commuter paradox, 
which is the label for the substantially welfare-reducing decisions 
people make about commuting, due to overvaluing the concrete 
benefits of positional goods such as a larger house, as compared with 
the diffuse losses of nonpositional goods such as traffic-induced 
aggravation.219 Given similar trade-offs between positional and 
nonpositional goods at stake in the mobility context, similar 
weighting errors might be expected to compromise sorting decisions. 
Hedonics research shows that these types of weighting errors can 
seriously undermine welfare calculations, because it is nonpositional 
goods like spending time with strong ties (precisely what we lose 
with a long-distance move) that have a greater impact on happiness 
than making more money.220 To be sure, there may be biases that 
 
and the Workplace, 5 PSYCH. SCI. PUB. INTEREST 69, 72, 77 (2004). 
 215. Id. at 76. 
 216. See id. 
 217. Salience bias means that people tend to focus on factors that are more prominent, 
immediate, and easier to process. See Deborah Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias in Designing 
Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253, 261–63 (2011). 
 218. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Values, Choices, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 341, 344–46 (1984). 
 219. There is an observed tendency to overvalue positional goods like money and real 
estate and undervalue nonpositional goods like social connections and walking to work. See 
Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Recent Advances in the Economics of Individual Subjective Well-
Being, 77 SOC. RES. INT’L Q. 679, 700–01 (2010). One Swiss study found that to move from 
no commuting time to twenty-two minutes of commuting time (each way), an individual 
requires an additional monthly income of approximately 470 Euros (or 35.4% of the average 
monthly income) to compensate for lost welfare. Alois Stutzer & Bruno S. Frey, Stress that 
Doesn’t Pay: The Commuting Paradox, 110 SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON. 339, 355 (2008). 
These are not the patterns observed. Id. 
 220. See Jon Bronsteen et al., Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Lawsuits, 108 
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cut the other way, e.g., the status quo bias,221 but on balance, the 
biases and weighting errors involved in mobility decision making 
should at least give us pause about decisions in this area. 
On the employer side, firms are also subject to limitations in 
decision making, including biases and information deficits, that may 
lead to suboptimal sorting-related decisions, including a failure to 
appreciate the productivity costs associated with long-distance 
sorting moves or the benefits of providing relocation 
accommodations. Due to salience bias, job qualifications listed on a 
resume and accessible in an interview will loom far larger than the 
typically unknown factors of the ability of a long-distance sorting 
employee (and her family) to adjust after a long-distance move.222 
Employers’ sorting-related decision making deficits may be especially 
problematic in the context of social strong ties. Focalism means that 
employers may wrongly pay little heed to what they consider 
“personal” matters outside the scope of the employment 
relationship.223  
Information asymmetries related to social strong ties also play a 
role.224 Employers may be reluctant to raise personal questions to 
applicants or new hires that may cross professional and legal 
boundaries.225 This means that “boundedly rational”226 managers are 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 1516, 1527 & n.56 (citing the economist Richard Easterlin for findings about 
“how quickly people adapt to increases in income due to concomitant changes in aspirations 
and how slowly they adapt to nonpecuniary benefits like family life”). 
In particular, people make decisions assuming that more income, comfort, and 
positional goods will make them happier, failing to recognize that hedonic 
adaptation and social comparison will come into play, raise their aspirations to about 
the same extent as their actual gains, and leave them feeling no happier than before. 
As a result, most individuals spend a disproportionate amount of their lives working 
to make money, and sacrifice family life and health, domains in which aspirations 
remain fairly constant as actual circumstances change, and where the attainment of 
one’s goals has a more lasting impact on happiness. Hence, a reallocation of time in 
favor of family life and health would, on average, increase individual happiness. 
Id. at 1527 n.56 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Richard A. Easterlin, Explaining 
Happiness, 100 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 11,176, 11,182 (2003)). 
 221. See Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1227, 1228–29 (2003). 
 222. See supra note 217. 
 223. See Schoenbaum, supra note 70, at 134. 
 224. Cf. J.H. Verkeke, Is the ADA Efficient?, 50 UCLA L. REV. 903, 911 (2003) 
(discussing inefficient hiring decisions resulting from information asymmetries about employee 
disabilities). 
 225. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-60(a)(9) (2009) (“It shall be a discriminatory practice . . . 
to request or require information from an employee . . . relating to . . . the individual’s familial 
responsibilities . . . .”). Anti-discrimination law limits employers’ ability to inquire about 
prospective employees’ personal circumstances. See, e.g., Schoenbaum, supra note 70, at 104, 
133 (discussing these laws and their construction of the boundaries of the employment 
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unlikely to have the information necessary to determine the costs of 
hiring long-distance sorters for productivity and morale or the 
benefits of providing relocation support for retention and 
integration.227 It also means that employers’ implementation of 
efficient relocation support is largely dependent on individual 
employee requests.228 Not every employee who would benefit from 
such support asks for it for fear that she will signal she is a “lemon”: 
an employee who is overly involved with her personal life and not 
fully committed to work.229 Indeed, although in dual-income 
families the clustering spouse’s work in the new location is critical to 
family adjustment, in one study fewer than one-fifth of clustering 
spouses reported that they received adequate support securing 
employment from the sorting spouse’s employer.230  
IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF MOBILITY MEASURES 
For married couples, long-distance sorting moves typically 
involve a relative distribution of sorting and clustering: one spouse 
sorts, and one spouse clusters. The sorting spouse—whose 
employment drives the move—benefits from sorting. While the 
sorting spouse may go from strong ties to weak workplace ties, the 
clustering spouse will go from strong to even weaker or perhaps no 
workplace ties, without offsetting sorting benefits. At the same time 
that the clustering spouse might not benefit from sorting, she might 
also provide more of the cushioning the family cluster insures. These 
distributional consequences fall along gender lines— husbands sort, 
and wives cluster—and contribute to the unequal economic 
circumstances of men and women, both inside and outside marriage. 
 
relationship). 
 226. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 211, 214 (1995) (explaining that “human rationality is normally bounded by 
limited information and limited information processing”). 
 227. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between 
Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 
1102 (2010) (discussing this problem in the context of caregiving accommodations). 
 228. See id. at 1100. 
 229. See Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market 
and the Possible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1958–59 (1996) 
(discussing the problem of negative signaling in the context of requesting a just-cause 
termination provision in an employment contract). 
 230. PERMITS FOUNDATION, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF EXPATRIATE SPOUSES AND 
PARTNERS 20–22 (Nov. 2009), available at 
http://www.permitsfoundation.com/docs/permits_survey_final_report.pdf (finding in survey 
of spouses on international assignment that those who worked were more likely to report a 
positive impact on adjustment, family relationships, and health and well-being). 
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A. Sorting Without Clustering and Clustering Without Sorting 
When dual-income married couples (the vast majority of married 
couples)231 move long distances for employment sorting purposes, 
the spouses typically do not both accrue employment advantages. 
Unless the maximum sorting position for each spouse is in the same 
location at the same time, one spouse will need to compromise on 
employment (by moving and giving up a job or staying and 
foregoing an opportunity).232 In such circumstances, employment 
sorting and family clustering conflict: the sorting positions for each 
spouse may be in different locations, but the cluster requires them to 
remain together. Alternatives to locating the spouses’ employment in 
the same location—long-distance marriage and long-distance 
commuting—pose their own significant costs.233 
The tradeoffs required between spouses by this conflict of sorting 
and clustering can be stark. While moving for even the sorting 
spouse destroys economically relevant strong ties, it also typically 
provides economic benefits, as well as an opportunity to recreate 
these ties over time. Because the clustering spouse does not typically 
enjoy employment benefits from sorting, and may be unemployed in 
the new location, her opportunities to regenerate economically 
relevant strong ties are further hampered. In addition, relocating 
multiple times to “trade off” on career opportunities is not a strategy 
that can be easily employed. Moving is expensive, not only because 
of relocation costs, but because of the mobility frictions that are the 
subject of this Article. 
Employment sorting focuses on individual employees, not on 
two employees—spouses—who are geographically tied. In providing 
no protections via at-will employment, sorting can happen regardless 
of the sorting of a spouse (think of a mandatory transfer), in contrast 
to a regime of contract employment in which couples could try to 
negotiate compatible contracts. Because of singular sorting, married 
couples must decide who benefits from the unequal sorting that 
results from long-distance moves. 
On the flip side, family clustering, which provides some social-tie 
 
 231. See ROSE M. KREIDER & DIANA B. ELLIOTT, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICA’S 
FAMILY AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: 2007, at 10 (2009). 
 232. Interestingly, family law in other countries may permit the intact family to submit 
location decisions to a court. In Spain, for instance, married couples with children can seek 
judicial resolution of a disputed relocation decision. See Max Rheinstein & Mary Ann Glendon, 
Interspousal Relations, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 12–13 
(Chloros ed., 1980). 
 233. See infra Parts V.B, V.C. 
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cushion for the family, does not account for enhanced sorting on the 
part of the sorting spouse, which often results in enhanced clustering 
on the part of the clustering spouse (i.e., a shift of more of the 
support role the family provides to this spouse).234 Therefore, 
assigning the sorting role to one spouse often results in assigning 
additional clustering responsibilities resulting from a long-distance 
move to the other spouse. The sorting spouse not only benefits from 
sorting, but, by taking on the role of the primary worker, is also less 
burdened by insufficient family clustering. Indeed, it is precisely the 
strong-tie insurance that the family cluster provides that eases the 
consequences of strong-tie losses for sorting spouses. But instead of 
clustering benefits to match the sorting benefits for her spouse, the 
clustering spouse faces deficits through the loss of strong ties caused 
by underclustering. In this way, the limitations of sorting and 
clustering further skew the distribution of sorting and clustering 
within a marriage. 
UI benefits for clustering spouses only partially address this 
conflict between employment sorting and family clustering. The 
benefits do not fully replace income, nor do they compensate for lost 
firm-specific human capital or strong workplace ties. Partial wage 
replacement may afford an opportunity for more rigorous job search 
in the new location.235 But by only compensating for some of the 
lost opportunity to sort, and by failing to provide any clustering 
support, the law fails to compensate the full range of losses the 
clustering spouse faces. 
Over time, the relative distribution of sorting and clustering 
becomes more lopsided. Marriage involves repeat bargaining: “the 
winner[] in one round get[s] a satisfactory outcome that would 
typically include not only more immediate benefit but also a better 
placing (and greater bargaining power) in the future.”236 When the 
sorting spouse drives the move, she will accrue disproportionate 
gains to career, while the clustering spouse will accrue 
disproportionate losses. This makes it more likely that the sorting 
spouse will drive the next move, and so on. While the initial gap may 
be small, it can grow quite wide over time, and trading off will 
 
 234. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT 
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 32–36 (2000) (describing the primary/secondary worker 
dynamic, and how carework is shifted to the secondary worker). 
 235. See Lester, supra note 86, at 342–43. 
 236. See Amartya Sen, Gender and Cooperative Conflicts, in PERSISTENT INEQUALITIES: 
WOMEN AND WORLD DEVELOPMENT 123, 137 (Irene Tinker ed., 1990) (“Finding a more 
‘productive’ employment . . . may . . . contribute not only to immediate well-being, but also to 
acquired skill and a better breakdown position for the future”). 
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become less likely. This places pressure on role specialization in 
marriage, casting some doubt on the prospects for egalitarian 
marriage with equally shared responsibilities in the home and the 
market.  
B. The Relative Distribution of Sorting and Clustering 
In married couples, husbands tend to sort, and wives tend to 
cluster. Husbands’ jobs are more likely to determine residential 
location, and wives are more likely to leave a job to accommodate a 
partner’s job change.237 This makes wives more likely to be “tied 
movers.”238 On the flip side, married women are less likely to relocate 
for enhanced employment opportunities, perhaps because their 
husbands are differentially willing to relocate for their wives’ 
careers.239 This makes wives more likely to be “tied stayers.”240 
This results in dramatic income differentials between husbands 
and wives. Whereas long-distance mobility boosts the career 
development of married men, for married women, mobility is 
accompanied by lower rates of employment and income growth.241 
When couples move, the income gap between husbands and wives 
increases significantly, on average to the tune of nearly $3,000.242 In 
fact, the impact of mobility is similar to the birth of a child on 
husbands’ and wives’ relative earnings.243 
Economists have proposed that family sorting decisions are 
determined by comparative advantages in human capital—i.e., 
sorting decisions will favor the partner who has the comparative 
advantage in market labor at the outset244—or by favorable changes 
in net family income—i.e., sorting decisions are based on the sum 
total of gain of income for one partner and loss of income for the 
other partner.245 But differences in human capital investments and 
 
 237. See SUSAN HANSON & GERALDINE PRATT, GENDER, WORK, AND SPACE 105, 126–
27 (1995). 
 238. Joy E. Pixley & Phyllis Moen, Prioritizing Careers, in IT’S ABOUT TIME 183, 184 
(Phyllis Moen ed., 2003) (emphasis added). 
 239. Id. at 186. 
 240. Id. at 184 (emphasis added). 
 241. Kimberlee A. Shauman & Mary C. Noonan, Family Migration and Labor Force 
Outcomes: Sex Differences in Occupational Context, 85 SOC. FORCES 1735, 1735 (2007). 
 242. Id. at 1748 (finding that moving tends to increase the annual earnings gap between 
husbands and wives by an average of $2,680). 
 243. See Thomas J. Cooke et al., Longitudinal Analysis of Family Migration and the 
Gender Gap in Earnings in the United States and Great Britain, 46 DEMOGRAPHY 150 
(2009). 
 244. GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 57 (1981). 
 245. Jacob Mincer, Family Migration Decisions, 86 J. POL. ECON. 749, 750 (1978). 
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income do not tell the whole story, suggesting that gender itself is a 
significant factor in determining the relative distribution of sorting 
and clustering. Married couples give priority to husbands’ careers 
and enhanced earnings in making relocation decisions, even 
controlling for the effects of human capital investments.246 Wives’ 
earning potential has little influence on the effect of mobility on 
employment, and, unlike men, mobility decreases their likelihood of 
employment.247 Indeed, women who are most committed to work—
those who work more than full time and those with nonworking 
husbands—face the greatest income penalty from family mobility.248 
Therefore, gender, apart from purely economic calculations, plays a 
significant role in relocation decisions. To the extent that gender 
trumps human capital investments and earning potential in sorting 
and clustering decisions, this compromises not only gender equality, 
but also efficient employment sorting and is another way in which 
sorting and clustering decisions may not be welfare maximizing.249 
While UI benefits for clustering spouses were instituted to ease 
these gendered sorting/clustering dynamics, and in particular, to 
“help women,”250 it is not clear whether subsidizing, and thereby 
incentivizing these gendered moves, without adequate sorting or 
clustering support or compensation, is to women’s benefit. If gender 
drives relocation decisions despite efficiency, as research suggests, 
there is less reason to be concerned about these incentive effects, as 
husbands’ careers may dictate family relocation decisions regardless 
of UI benefits.251 
The gendered distribution of sorting and clustering may go a 
long way towards explaining the ongoing gender wage gap. The 
clustering spouse’s employment prospects in the new location may 
be limited.252 Even an initially small income gap grows over time and 
 
 246. See Shauman & Noonan, supra note 241, at 1735 (rejecting human capital theory 
based on findings that equalizing the distribution of human capital between married men and 
women would not lead to a more equal distribution of the returns to mobility). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. at 1755. 
 249. See supra Part III.C for a discussion of shortcomings in such decisions. 
 250. H.R. REP. NO. 110-414, pt. 1 at 72 (2007) (requiring benefits “would particularly 
help women, who are . . . more likely to need to leave work . . . [to] follow[] a spouse”). 
 251. See infra Part V.A.2 for further discussion of incentive effects. 
 252. See Shauman & Noonan, supra note 241, at 1745 (compared to immobile wives, 
those who move are 22% less likely to remain employed across any one-year interval, and their 
earnings grow by 760 fewer dollars). Of course the clustering spouse may place limits on 
relocation for her own employment purposes. For example, she might refuse to move without 
a job lined up in the new location. 
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as a result of additional long-distance moves.253 And gender 
differentials in sorting and clustering become even more problematic 
following a divorce. After years of the husband sorting and the wife 
clustering, the income gap, exacerbated by these mobility measures, 
may not be compensated upon divorce.254  
Employment exit (or threat of exit) may have a different 
signaling function to employers based on gender. It is often assumed 
that “[m]en can change jobs, because the presumption is that they 
are ‘moving up,’ and all rational employers want talented, ambitious 
workers, even if they sometimes lose them.”255 If women sort, 
however, “the inference might not be so much that they were 
talented and ambitious, like men, but rather than they had to follow 
their husband around. A rational firm would be wary of hiring 
someone who might move for reasons it could not know or 
control.”256 And given that women are more likely to be tied stayers, 
employers may believe that they don’t need to “match higher wage 
opportunities available in distant locations” for women employees, 
contributing to the gender wage gap.257 
These gendered sorting and clustering dynamics may also create 
preemptive anti-sorting effects for women. Although Title VII bars 
sex discrimination in employment, employers may be less likely to 
consider women for positions that require relocation.258 The recent 
sex-discrimination class action against Wal-Mart was based in part on 
the company’s requirement that sales associates be willing to relocate 
for promotions.259 The dissent noted the risk “that managers will act 
on the familiar assumption that women, because of their services to 
husband and children, are less mobile than men.”260 
Gendered sorting and clustering dynamics may even contribute 
 
 253. See Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, 
Market Efficiency and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595 (1993). 
 254. See Joan C. Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. 
L.J. 2227, 2247 & n.91 (1994) (discussing how temporary alimony fails to account for 
gendered market labor and carework dynamics within marriage). 
 255. EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 259 (1997). 
 256. Id. Although federal law bars hiring discrimination on the basis of sex, it still occurs 
with frequency. See Schoenbaum, supra note 70, at 125–26. 
 257. William T. Bielby & Denise D. Bielby, I Will Follow Him: Family Ties, Gender-Role 
Beliefs, and Reluctance to Relocate for a Better Job, 97 AM. J. SOC. 1241, 1241 (1992). 
 258. DEP’T OF LAB., FEDERAL GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: 
MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION’S HUMAN CAPITAL 151 (1995) (reporting that women 
are not asked to relocate as frequently as men). 
 259. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2563 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
 260. Id. 
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to gender differences in initial career choices, with a corresponding 
impact on the wage gap. One of the defining features of the U.S. 
labor market is occupational segregation by sex. Approximately one-
third to 40% of employed women would have to switch occupational 
categories to replicate the male occupational distribution pattern.261 
This is a distinction with a difference for mobility purposes: the 
“pink collar” jobs largely populated by women tend to be 
geographically ubiquitous—that is, they can be done anywhere.262 
The geographic ubiquity of women’s occupations assists in family 
clustering, because women’s employment can be less of a drag on 
their husbands’ sorting preferences.263 But this flexibility comes with 
a cost: these geographically ubiquitous jobs pay less.264 Occupational 
segregation affects married and single women alike. So traditional 
economic theories of family relocation may have it exactly 
backwards—it is not that women trail because they earn less; women 
may earn less because they expect (or are expected) to trail.265 
V. MOBILITY MODIFICATIONS 
Mobility for sorting purposes has generally been recognized as an 
unmitigated good. While mobility may have significant benefits, the 
relationship and economic costs, as well as the distributional 
consequences, imposed by employment sorting in light of family 
clustering complicate this story. Determining the optimum level of 
mobility and whether we are currently above or below that optimum 
level is beyond the scope of this Article. This Part nonetheless tries to 
make progress not primarily by adjusting mobility levels, but instead 
by suggesting three principal ways to adjust sorting and clustering to 
provide better support upon a move and to recognize strong ties 
 
 261. Michael Ransom & Ronald L. Oaxaca, Intrafirm Mobility and Sex Differences in 
Pay, 58 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 219, 220 (2005). 
 262. Some examples are school teachers, nurses, and secretaries. See Shauman & Noonan, 
supra note 241, at 1738–39. 
 263. Larry H. Long, Women’s Labor Force Participation and the Residential Mobility of 
Families, 52 J. SOC. FORCES 342, 348 (1974). 
 264. Women earned 75% of what their male counterparts earned in 2009, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
COMMERCE, WOMEN IN AMERICA 7 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/Women_in_America.pdf. Some 
proportion of the pay gap is attributable to occupational segregation. See Paula England, 
Gender Inequality in Labor Markets: The Role of Motherhood and Segregation, 12 SOC. POL. 
264, 276 (2005). 
 265. Janice Compton & Robert A. Pollak, Why are Power Couples Increasingly 
Concentrated in Large Metropolitan Areas?, 25 J. LAB. ECON. 475, 479 (2007) (collecting 
studies consistent with this effect, and noting that in light of expectations of clustering, 
“women may tend to enter more mobile careers”). 
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outside of the nuclear family: (1) recalibrating employment sorting, 
(2) recalibrating family clustering, and (3) exploring the 
agglomeration benefits of cities as a way to mitigate sorting and 
clustering costs by providing more job opportunities in one place. 
These ideas are not meant to put an end to mobility, but to allow for 
better sorting and clustering decisions, and to alleviate some of 
mobility’s costs and distributional burdens while enhancing its 
benefits. 
A. Recalibrating Employment Sorting 
Recalibrating employment sorting through adjustments to at-will 
employment or laws that eliminate barriers to sorting would be 
overbroad because these laws reach far beyond sorting. A better 
approach would be to adjust the costs of sorting for both employers 
and employees. The goal of these adjustments is to improve 
employer and employee sorting decisions, to incentivize employers 
to internalize some of the costs of sorting, and to provide better 
support to offset the costs of sorting. 
1. Recalibrating sorting costs for employers 
Making hiring long-distance sorters relatively more expensive for 
employers would internalize some of the costs of sorting on non-
sorting parties. Employers will then take steps to avoid long-distance 
sorting when the employer could achieve the same result with nearby 
workers and rely on sorting only when the benefits exceed the 
recalibrated costs. Placing a modest cost on long-distance sorting 
could offset employers’ shortcomings in decision making that lead 
them to underestimate the productivity costs of sorting.266 While 
employers share some of the productivity costs of lost strong ties,267 
they also accrue benefits from long-distance sorting268 and so should 
also internalize the costs. Moreover, the employer is the least cost 
avoider for optimizing sorting.269 The firm is in the best position not 
only to know when sorting is necessary for its business purposes, but 
also to implement measures that would integrate employees into the 
workplace and the community.270 Employers are also easier targets 
 
 266. See supra Part III.C. 
 267. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 268. See supra Part II.A. 
 269. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 205–06 (7th ed. 2007) 
(explaining that when harm can be avoided by more than one actor, the lowest-cost harm 
avoider should do so, since that will best avert the harm). 
 270. See Kevin J. Coco, Beyond the Price Tag: An Economic Analysis of Title III of the 
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than individuals for de-biasing efforts. 
A direct measure to adjust the relative costs of sorting would 
make it more expensive for employers to hire long-distance sorters as 
compared with local employees. Many areas of employment law rely 
on the distinction between “local” and “non-local” workers, defined 
by whether the employee lives within a “reasonable commuting 
distance” of her job.271 The UI experience-rating system could 
require increased employer contributions based on the number of 
long-distance sorters the employer hires. The funds generated could 
go to providing the employer contribution breaks or benefits to 
long-distance sorters suggested below.272 To the extent that these 
costs are passed through to sorters in the form of lower wages, this is 
not necessarily undesirable, as this could internalize the costs that 
sorters now impose on their communities. The UI scheme is a 
natural home for these requirements because it is meant to address 
macroeconomic issues of labor supply and demand, including 
employment sorting.273 Any constitutional problems with local hiring 
preferences will be limited to public employers.274  
2. Recalibrating sorting costs for employees 
Facilitating laws that provide subsidies to offset the costs of 
sorting also incentivize precisely that costly behavior. The challenge 
of avoiding a moral hazard that arises when, as in the case of moving, 
a beneficiary can control eligibility for benefits, is a stubborn 
problem in the law.275 The seemingly elusive goal here would be to 
provide needed support for those who would make moves but for 
the subsidy without incentivizing additional moves. There is 
insufficient data on the incentive effects of sorting subsidies that 
 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 20 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 58, 92 (2010). 
 271. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. § 639.5(b)(3) (explaining that “‘reasonable commuting distance’ 
will vary with local and industry conditions,” and that “consideration should be given to the 
following factors: geographic accessibility of the place of work, the quality of the roads, 
customarily available transportation, and the usual travel time”). 
 272. See infra Part V.A.2. 
 273. See Lester, supra note 86, at 342–43. 
 274. See Keaton Norquist, Local Preferences in Affordable Housing: Special Treatment For 
Those Who Live or Work in a Municipality?, 36 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 207, 209, 214–21 
(2009). 
 275. See Lee Anne Fennell, Relative Burdens: Family Ties and the Safety Net, 45 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1453, 1503–06 (2004) (discussing the “controllability” problem in providing 
benefits for dependence support); Kenneth J. Arrow, Insurance, Risk, and Resource Allocation, 
in 4 COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 77, 85 
(1984) (defining “moral hazard” as when “[t]he insurance policy might itself change 
incentives and therefore the probabilities upon which the insurance company has relied”). 
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would permit a conclusive analysis of the trade-offs of incentive 
effects with the need for support.276 In time, state-by-state 
implementation of UI benefits for clustering spouses will provide a 
natural experiment across states with and without these benefits, 
with data ripe for study.277 Until such data is available, there are 
other ways to think about the problem. 
The purpose of sorting subsidies is to offset some of the costs of 
sorting. In particular, UI benefits for clustering spouses partially 
offset lost wages. Although these benefits are paid to the clustering 
spouse, they increase household income, and may accrue to the 
benefit of more than just the clustering spouse.278 To the extent the 
financial impact of a spouse’s job loss on the family is alleviated by 
these benefits, the clustering spouse’s power in bargaining over the 
relocation is reduced. However, UI benefits provide income that 
may permit a more prolonged search to enhance job opportunities in 
the new location.279 While the benefits of needed support may 
outweigh the incentive effects,280 cash subsidies could be adjusted to 
reduce incentives for more costly moves by incorporating a form of 
experience rating so that benefits are decreased as the number of 
moves increases above a threshold,281 or by providing a bonus 
payment for moves close to strong ties.282 
Although cash subsidies are generally thought to be more 
efficient,283 alternative mechanisms may better mitigate incentive 
 
 276. See generally Ernie Goss & Chris Paul, The Impact of Unemployment Insurance 
Benefits on the Probability of Migration of the Unemployed, 30 J. REG. SCI. 349 (1990) 
(discussing conflicting data on whether UI benefits increase or decrease mobility). 
 277. Such comparisons across states have been conducted on the effects of minimum 
wage on employment levels. See generally David Card & Alan B. Krueger, Minimum Wages 
and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, 84 
AM. ECON. REV. 772 (1994). 
 278. Who receives the household benefits may matter for how the benefits are allocated 
among members of the household. Jackie Goode et al., Findings: Distribution of Income 
Within Families Receiving Benefits, JOSEPH ROWNTREE FOUNDATION (1998), available at 
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/spr468.pdf (finding that benefits paid directly to 
mothers are more likely to be spent in ways that benefit children or the family as a whole than 
if they go to fathers). To the extent that mothers are more willing to sacrifice benefits and 
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expend UI benefits in ways that will enhance their opportunities—e.g., interview attire, career 
coaching, etc., defeating some of the purpose of UI benefits. 
 279. See Lester, supra note 86, at 342. 
 280. See supra Part IV.B on gender and incentive effects. 
 281. See Fennell, supra note 275, at 1505 (noting experience rating as a mechanism to 
correct moral hazard). 
 282. See infra Part V.B.2 on corrective mobility. 
 283. Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121, 230 (2004) 
(“[G]enerally speaking, in-kind subsidies are thought of as less efficient than cash subsidies 
1165 Mobility Measures 
 1219 
effects. In-kind subsidies in the form of sorting accommodations in 
the new location could do so by trading on biases related to sorting. 
Because sorters do not fully appreciate sorting consequences ex 
ante,284 they also would be unlikely to appreciate fully the value of 
this subsidy ex ante, making incentive effects less likely as well. This 
means in-kind benefits can be calibrated to provide additional 
support to individuals and families who make moves that impose 
greater costs—repeated moves, longer distance moves, and moves to 
locations where there are no strong ties—with less concern about 
further incentivizing these moves.285 To the extent that sorting 
accommodations integrate newcomers into the community, they act 
as universal programs promoting strong ties for all, which are likely 
to garner broader support.286 To the extent that cash subsidies might 
be appropriated for other household uses,287 in-kind benefits assure 
their use for the clustering spouse. Finally, some of the strong-tie 
losses that sorters experience cannot easily be replaced in the market 
and can be better provided through in-kind organizational efforts, 
whether by public entities or employers, aimed at creating 
communities.  
In-kind relocation assistance could be publicly provided, or 
incentives could be implemented for employers to provide this 
support (who would then have the option to outsource it). While 
employers will benefit from these programs, broader community 
benefits, along with potential free-riding problems of employer-
provided support (due to difficulty internalizing these community 
benefits) might augur in favor of public provision. A range of 
scholarship urges employers to take steps to overcome the 
“entrenched and often unnoticed barriers”,288 preventing employers 
from providing support for employees, and therefore failing to 
optimize the employment relationship. Incentives for employers to 
provide relocation accommodations for long-distance sorters would 
not only address the relationship and economic costs of strong-tie 
losses,289 but would also make hiring long-distance sorters modestly 
 
because the recipient may only use the in-kind subsidy for specified purposes.”). 
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more expensive for employers, at least in the short term, leading 
employers to rely on sorting more judiciously. This would help to 
enhance the welfare effects of sorting in the face of imperfect 
decision making. 
Employers could encourage long-distance movers to create 
professional strong ties in the new location by supporting activities 
that bring distance movers together with more senior employees, 
such as management retreats, company social events, community 
service activities, and networking functions.290 Intra-company 
advocacy groups, such as the Xerox Corporation’s Black Caucus, can 
build important ties bridging departments within the firm.291 Even 
firm architecture can make a difference. A lunchroom where distance 
movers can meet other employees can promote strong ties. This type 
of sorting support may create a workplace culture that more readily 
incorporates sorters, normalizing their influx and reducing their lack 
of legitimacy. Strong workplace ties can also mitigate relationship 
costs, as coworkers can become personal friends,292 who can then 
introduce sorters to new ties and help integrate them into the 
community. 
Employers could also establish mechanisms for “outsider” long-
distance movers to “borrow” social capital from more senior 
employees until they earn legitimacy within the firm. Borrowing 
social capital involves developing a strong tie with a “legitimate” 
figure and then connecting to that employee’s strong ties. In Japan, 
industry-specific directories that put outsiders in touch with 
legitimate insider figures assist in developing relationships with 
Japanese companies.293 Distance movers could utilize similar 
directories of legitimate figures within a firm or professional 
community to borrow social capital. 
For long-distance sorters who move with family members, an 
even bigger concern is the family’s adjustment to the area, in 
particular, a spouse’s employment adjustment.294 To ease this stress, 
and to mitigate the gendered distribution of sorting and clustering, 
employers could provide assistance for clustering spouses to find 
work in the new location through local contacts, career counseling, 
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and placement services. The federal government is already at work 
on providing such support to spouses of service members as part of a  
 
 
government-wide initiative to improve support to military families, 
especially with relation to repeated long-distance sorting.295 
Still further, employers could mitigate the additional pressure on 
support functions after a long-distance move. The lack of public or 
private support for caregiving and its interference with employment 
advancement, especially for women, has received much attention.296 
While greater support for caregiving would ease the burdens of 
sorting, general consideration of this topic is outside the scope of 
this Article. My focus is different: how mobility measures construct 
circumstances in which individuals and families are without even 
their privately arranged caregiving supports. Employers could assist 
sorters with support to regenerate these private arrangements, 
through, for example, referral services for care-providers, as well as 
the flexibility to make these arrangements (and to perform more 
caregiving until they are made). Limiting these services just to the 
time period after a move provides them when they are most needed 
and makes them cheaper and thus more palatable to employers. 
A number of mechanisms could incentivize employers to provide 
such accommodations. Employers who provide this sort of support 
to their employees could get a break in their contributions to the UI 
fund. Another soft enforcement mechanism would be mandatory 
disclosure of employers’ sorting adjustment policies and programs 
for new hires and transfers. This type of “‘targeted transparency’”—
an increasingly popular tool for nudging private behavior—does not 
seek merely to provide better information, but also to enhance 
performance beyond the scope of mandates.297 Many large firms 
already try to cultivate a reputation for going beyond compliance on 
salient issues that affect worker welfare,298 like adjustment assistance 
for long-distance movers. Mandatory disclosure of sorting 
adjustment programs could lead to a race to the top for these 
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programs. Finally, education campaigns by federal or state labor 
departments could reduce employers’ bias in sorting decisions,  
 
especially by making employers more aware of the benefits to the 
firm of employees’ strong ties.  
Another way to recalibrate sorting costs would be to make an 
alternative to sorting—telework—cheaper. Aside from a host of 
environmental and work-family balance benefits of 
telecommuting,299 the costs of long-distance sorting provide another 
reason to increase opportunities for telework. Telework would allow 
a worker to sort without the need for geographic proximity to the 
workplace. Telework could be supplemented with in-office visits and 
conference calls so that strong workplace ties can still develop. 
Although telework is not an option for all jobs, technological 
improvements and increasing availability of remote work may make 
this a possibility for a growing number of workers.300 Requirements 
for federal agencies to implement telework policies and increase the 
number of off-site workers, as well as more recent support for 
telecommuting by the President’s Council of Economic Advisers301 
and the First Lady herself,302 suggest that telework may become 
increasingly common and accepted. 
Tax law may serve as an impediment to telework, especially 
across state borders. An employer located in one state with a single 
employee telecommuting in another state can face tax obligations 
from the state where the employee resides.303 A telecommuting 
employee whose employer and home are in different states may face 
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double state taxation,304 and telecommuters, as compared to those 
who are self-employed, may be excluded from the home office tax 
deduction.305 These barriers to telecommuting should be replaced 
with more favorable tax treatment. 
B. Recalibrating Family Clustering 
The family cluster can be recalibrated to provide better 
cushioning for and against long-distance moves by expanding the 
scope of strong ties recognized as a cluster relevant for geographic 
purposes. A number of possible configurations, both those limited to 
times of mobility, as well as broader interventions, are discussed 
below. To further recalibrate the family cluster, I propose ways in 
which the law should recognize the significance of strong ties as a 
reason for long-distance moves. 
1. Reconfiguring the family cluster 
A narrow intervention would expand the individuals eligible for 
relocation subsidies beyond the nuclear family. For example, not just 
spouses, but other strong ties such as close friends or extended 
family members would be eligible for UI benefits if they wished to 
move over distances with their strong ties who were relocating for 
employment purposes. Such subsidies would not have to go to the 
same individual or individuals upon each move. This would mean 
that entrenched sorting and clustering roles would be unlikely, as 
individuals, in shifting relocation ties, could also trade off in sorting 
and clustering roles. Taking relocation benefits outside of marriage 
would acknowledge the importance of strong ties in addition to the 
family cluster. This would especially benefit singles and may help to 
de-gender sorting and clustering dynamics. 
The potential for a larger cluster means that the relative 
distribution of sorting and clustering could be beneficially adjusted. 
While one member of the cluster may still receive the primary 
benefits of sorting, several members could absorb the additional 
clustering responsibilities, which would afford each more time to 
balance these with work. Of course, expanding the class of persons 
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who are eligible for clustering subsidies could also expand the 
number whose employment may be disrupted by a move. Practical 
considerations would likely keep the members of the cluster to a 
reasonably small number, and the number could be limited to guard 
against overly disruptive clusters. 
Without the security that comes from a more stable 
commitment, however, strong ties might be reluctant to make a 
long-distance move, especially in light of strong family clustering 
norms.306 To shift the contours of the family cluster then requires 
not just interventions around mobility, but more significant 
interventions reconfiguring the family cluster—in other words, 
rethinking the foundational enabling laws that shape the cluster 
itself. Doing so would require providing legal recognition to non-
nuclear family relationships.  
One reconfiguration of the cluster would grant marital rights and 
privileges of care and support to any designated strong tie, what I 
refer to as “designated partners.” France and Canada already allow 
two economically interdependent people who live together to 
designate each other for a legal status in which they perform 
marriage-like care and support functions.307 Alternatively, as Martha 
Fineman has proposed, the state could recognize and support 
relationships that involve dependent caregiving rather than 
marriage.308 Providing rights and duties of care and support to those 
outside the nuclear family would reshape the family cluster to include 
designated partners or Fineman’s caregivers. Facilitating laws could 
also include relocation subsidies for these designated partners or 
caregivers. 
Expanding family clustering along these lines would afford 
singles the option to be in the same position as married couples vis-
à-vis long-distance moves by entering into a designated partnership: 
to have one strong tie come with you upon a move, and to have one 
strong tie not move without you. But a system of designated 
partners is still limited to a pair (or perhaps a larger but still small 
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number for Fineman’s caregivers), so like marriage, it continues to 
ignore other strong ties. This option does offer a substantial 
improvement over marriage in states that restrict the union to 
couples of opposite gender. Same-sex designated partners moving 
together could change the odds that men or women predominantly 
sort or cluster, destabilizing gendered sorting and clustering 
dynamics. 
Another reconfiguration of the family cluster would unbundle 
the rights and privileges associated with marriage and allow 
individuals, single or married, to divide these rights and privileges 
among different relationships, as proposed by Laura Rosenbury.309 
Not only would this “unbundling” allow spouses and unmarried 
individuals alike to detach their relocation subsidies from other 
privileges and expand the scope of strong ties that are recognized 
upon a move, but by providing rights and privileges to those outside 
the nuclear family, it would make it more likely that we would 
remain near or move with these strong ties. The legal unbundling of 
rights and privileges across strong ties has the expressive power to 
unravel the tightness of the family cluster as the only site for 
geographically significant ties.310 This could lead to a rebalancing of 
the domestic family and other strong ties in the mobility calculus. 
While we may choose to stay near or move with non-nuclear-family 
strong ties without intervention of the law, arranging one’s life 
around others is risky without the security that comes with legal 
protection. 
Spreading the rights and privileges associated with marriage 
across persons, as suggested by Laura Rosenbury, might cut back on 
the portability of both singles and family clusters. But the flexibility 
of this scheme would afford some ability to calibrate the portability 
of the cluster, both through the number of ties that were afforded 
rights, and how the rights were distributed. Some marital obligations 
require physical presence (e.g., FMLA benefits); others can be 
satisfied from afar (e.g., social security benefits). Geographically 
sensitive obligations could be granted to nearby strong ties that an 
individual wants to remain near, and geographically insensitive 
obligations could be granted to strong ties who live far away or are 
highly mobile. Those seeking more rootedness could spread rights 
and privileges across multiple persons within her community; those 
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seeking more mobility could be more parsimonious (or could spread 
these rights and privileges across persons in different geographic 
areas where she might move). Some limit on flexibility is needed, 
however, because at some point the administrability concern 
outweighs flexibility. A mechanism akin to “divorce” could allow 
individuals to rearrange rights and duties across strong ties to 
accommodate long-distance moves. While the flexibility of 
unbundling may increase the cost of administration,311 these costs 
must be balanced against the benefit that, unlike marriage, a take-it-
or-leave-it status, this unbundled option allows for individual 
choice.312 
Something akin to this unbundling of marriage is already 
happening de facto in a small but growing number of families.313 
While the law embodies a strong presumption of nuclear family 
unity, employment sorting may trump family clustering such that 
spouses live apart in “commuter” or “long-distance” marriages, 
either temporarily or for the duration of the relationship. 
Historically, long-distance marriage is associated with a couple in 
which both spouses are strongly attached to geographically specific 
careers, for example, a dual-academic couple.314 In these cases, 
sorting for both spouses may trump clustering. In the slack labor 
market of the Great Recession, long-distance marriages are on the 
rise, and encompass a broader set of couples who have physically 
separated for lack of better options.315 
Long-distance spouses face significant challenges in a world 
where the law grants all care and support obligations to spouses and 
not to other strong ties. The unbundling of the obligations of 
marriage would ease some of the burdens of a long-distance marriage 
by allowing some care and support functions to be provided by other 
nearby strong ties. While for the vast majority of long-distance 
marriages, physical separation is a second-best option, these 
marriages nonetheless may constructively challenge gendered 
sorting/clustering dynamics. In addition to unbundling the cluster, 
 
 311. See I.R.C. §§ 163–164 (2006). 
 312. State regulation of strong ties outside of the nuclear family could be subject to the 
criticism that scholars have raised with regard to legal recognition of same-sex relationships, 
which is that recognition of these relationships can rob them of their unique character by 
holding them subject to the prevailing legal norms. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Politics 
of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006). 
 313. There are approximately 3.6 million married Americans living apart (excluding 
separated couples). Conlin, supra note 310. 
 314. See generally WOLF-WENDEL, ET AL., supra note 309. 
 315. See Conlin, supra note 310. 
1165 Mobility Measures 
 1227 
the law could better support these couples by allowing them to 
consider both of their homes primary residences for tax purposes, as 
current law allows only one home to receive this beneficial tax 
treatment,316 and by providing a tax deduction for the 
communication and visitation costs of maintaining these 
relationships. 
2. Recognizing relocations motivated by strong ties 
Aside from reconfiguring the family cluster, the law could 
recognize and support strong ties outside the nuclear family by 
putting relocations motivated by strong ties on equal footing with 
those motivated by employment sorting. This would mean that 
whatever benefits are afforded for long-distance sorting should be 
extended to relocations to be near strong ties. Short of this, the law 
could provide symmetrical subsidies for corrective relocations. There 
are two types of moves that would qualify as corrective. First, 
corrective mobility would be satisfied by a move that returned the 
movers to a place where they had developed a strong-tie network, for 
example, a place where they had previously lived. Second, corrective 
mobility would be satisfied by a move to a place where the mover 
would have stayed in or moved to but for the influence of the family 
cluster, for example, a post-divorce move that would allow a 
clustering spouse to return to her home town. In custody relocation 
cases, equal consideration should be given to a parent who seeks to 
move for strong-tie support as a parent who seeks to move for 
employment. An additionally strong presumption favoring relocation 
should apply to cases of corrective mobility. 
C. Agglomeration: The Benefits of Sorting Without All the Costs 
The problem of mobility measures can be seen as a problem of 
distance: the distance between the jobs of the spouses if both were to 
sort maximally for employment, and the distance between strong ties 
that mobility imposes. One solution is to shorten the distance by 
agglomerating many employment opportunities, as well as strong 
ties, in one place. This is precisely the benefit provided by cities, and 
so sorting and clustering might be altered to acknowledge that 
reality. “Agglomeration economics,” the notion that “individuals 
and businesses make their location decisions on the basis of where 
other individuals and businesses decide to locate” has garnered much 
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recent attention.317 The positive externalities of agglomeration might 
better balance sorting and clustering considerations. 
Agglomeration of firms and people in cities presents increased 
labor market depth, both on the supply and demand side. Deep 
labor markets provide a greater opportunity to sort across employers 
to maximize labor value without changing geography. Labor market 
depth enhances employment sorting because “[a]s urban workers 
develop new skills, they can switch to suitable jobs” without moving, 
which incentivizes human capital investments.318 Deep labor markets 
reduce job search costs, allowing employees to sort among firms 
more easily and better maximize productivity.319 Multiple 
employment options means one employer failing does not require a 
move to find other employment. Because of reduced search and 
sorting costs, incentives to develop human capital, and intellectual 
spillovers, agglomeration may promote growth better than 
geographic sorting. 
Because agglomeration reduces the need for long-distance moves 
to sort, labor value can be maximized without sacrificing local strong 
ties and the support they provide. Of course, sorting across jobs even 
without a long-distance move will impose the loss of strong 
workplace ties. But these lost ties will be less significant because they 
will remain in the circle of local professional contacts. Moreover, the 
loss of strong ties in the workplace will not be felt as acutely when it 
is not accompanied by all of the additional losses—strong social ties, 
spousal job loss, disruption for children—imposed by a long-distance 
move. 
Increasing the ability to sort across jobs without a long-distance 
move would alleviate the conflict that singles currently face: moving 
for a job opportunity, or staying near their strongest ties. The more 
that singles can retain their strong ties over time, the more secure 
they will feel in those ties, and the more rooted they may become. 
Greater stability of strong-tie support for singles could go some way 
towards alleviating the privilege of marriage over other strong ties.320 
Cities also provide singles with a deeper market for new strong ties, 
which can be important for new friends and for dating, for those 
who seek to develop new family clusters.321 
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Living in a major metropolitan area can also reduce the conflict 
between sorting and clustering within the family. The deeper labor 
markets found in cities present more employment opportunities for 
two workers in the same place.322 Indeed, there is a higher 
percentage of two-career couples in which both spouses have a 
college degree living in the largest metropolitan areas,323 and the gap 
between married men’s and married women’s incomes decreases 
with urban size.324 Because sorting across jobs will less often require 
a long-distance move, the strong-tie network remains in place. 
Although there may be greater career pressures and more demanding 
work expectations in large metropolitan areas that make it harder to 
balance work and family, the consistency of strong ties provided by a 
stable location can offset these demands. 
To optimize employment sorting in light of family clustering, it 
is not just agglomeration, but dense agglomeration that is best. The 
expense of living in an urban center often leads people to live and 
work in the suburbs—sometimes different suburbs.325 This means 
that individuals commute longer distances between home and work 
and that maximizing sorting for both spouses, who may have jobs in 
different suburbs, can involve long commutes. Americans spend on 
average fifty minutes per day commuting.326 The number of 
Americans engaged in extreme commutes—an hour-and-a-half to 
work and back—has grown 95% since 1990, to 3.4 million 
workers.327 While there are many causes for extreme commutes, 
employment sorting and family clustering are critical sources.328  
The costs of long commutes are difficult to overstate. In addition 
to fuel expense and pollution, commuting takes a big toll on 
commuters. Commuting worsens life satisfaction, physical health, 
and productivity,329 and causes a hit to strong ties: every ten minutes 
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of commute time cuts one’s social connections by 10%.330 Long 
commutes also burden the already tight time allocation for 
employment and caregiving demands. Women are less likely to take 
on long commutes for this reason, limiting their employment 
opportunities in the context of sprawl.331 
Many employers and residents already recognize the benefits of 
cities by choosing to locate there. A significant barrier to 
agglomeration is the expense of city living, although this expense is 
at least partially compensated by an urban wage premium.332 The 
expense is particularly significant for families, who tend to be more 
concerned with the cost of housing given the need for a larger home, 
as well as access to good public schools. But residential location 
decisions between relatively more or less dense areas are not 
independent from legal policies that have affected the cost of such 
decisions. Over the last several decades, transportation and housing 
law and policy have subsidized suburban and exurban sprawl that has 
made suburban and exurban living relatively cheaper in relation to 
city living and thus influenced housing and capital location 
decisions.333 
Shifting the relative costs of urban as compared with suburban or 
exurban locations will make it more attractive for both individuals 
and firms to sort to cities. Others have considered how to make cities 
relatively cheaper through modifying housing and transportation 
policies.334 The costs associated with long-distance sorting, and the 
potential for agglomeration to alleviate these costs, is another reason 
to adjust the cost of city living. 
Although recalibrating the cost of locating in more and less 
dense areas may be best addressed outside of employment law and 
family law, mobility measures could be recalibrated so that when 
sorting happens, it is more likely to be to cities. One way to promote 
agglomeration through mobility measures would be to make sorting 
to cities cheaper for employees, through a bonus subsidy for these 
moves. Another way to promote sorting to cities would be to 
enhance employment opportunities there either directly or indirectly 
by encouraging employers to locate there. For example, employers 
could be granted further favorable UI treatment, in the form of 
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reduced contributions into the system, by hiring employees in 
metropolitan areas. Favorable tax treatment for city hires could also 
be applied. Public-private partnerships for economic growth, 
including both industrial recruitment and more entrepreneurial 
approaches, could target more resources towards densely populated 
metropolitan areas. Not only do these investments reap greater 
rewards when they are aimed at areas where there is already 
agglomeration,335 but such investments would also drive more 
capital, and thus more employees, towards cities. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Good work and close ties, both inside and outside the family, are 
two of the most crucial ways we imbue our lives with meaning—and 
two of the most crucial aspects of life that affect and are affected by 
geographic mobility. Employment law and family law together play a 
central role in regulating these critical parts of our lives, and so 
together force us to ask the question “how portable is your life?” By 
looking at the ways in which these areas of law affect how, why, and 
how often we move over distances, we can bring more conscious 
consideration to the question of how portable our lives are, and 
perhaps even more importantly, how portable we want them to be.  
Greater legal recognition of the significance of place-specific 
investments, in addition to bearing relationship and economic fruit, 
has the further potential even to change—and enhance—our 
relationship to place. Moreover, because good work and strong ties 
have different meanings for everyone, shifting the legal boundaries of 
how and why we move, and what we can take along with us, may 
open up a more flexible space to recognize work and ties in ways that 
better accommodates varied preferences and circumstances. By 
recalibrating the portability of work and significant relationships, 
modified mobility measures may allow us to derive more satisfaction 
and reward from both—providing more and better answers to the 
portability question than we thought possible. 
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